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BEHAVIORAL LEGAL ETHICS
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight1
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers’ ethical improprieties2 are frequently the subject of jokes,3
movies,4 public opinion surveys,5 disciplinary filings,6 and news stories.
Open a recent newspaper or check your favorite website and you may see
stories about attorneys failing to investigate (let alone discipline) alleged

1.
Robbennolt is Professor of Law and Psychology, University of Illinois. Sternlight is
Saltman Professor and Director Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas Boyd School of Law. The paper is an expanded version of a chapter in our book,
PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION,
LITIGATION AND DECISION MAKING (2012). We thank Michael Kagan, Kate Kruse, Jeff Meyer,
Nancy Rapoport, Arden Rowell, Bill Stempel, Jeff Stempel, Nina Tarr, and participants at the
ABA Dispute Resolution Section Annual Meeting, the Yale-Quinnipiac Dispute Resolution
Workshop, and Vanderbilt Law School for their helpful comments. We thank Patrick Beisell,
Jessica Bregant, Jhaniel James, Geordan Logan, Sarah Mead, and David Schnell-Davis for their
research assistance.
2.
When we discuss lawyers’ “ethics” we refer not only to compliance with the formal
professional rules of ethics and other relevant statutory provisions, but also to behavior that is
consistent with one’s own moral compass.
3.
See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, What Do Lawyer Jokes Tell Us About Lawyers and
Lawyering, 23 CORNELL L.F. 3, 3 (1996); Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of
Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 816 (1998);
Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 379, 379 (1987); Robert E. Scott, The Lawyer as Public Citizen, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 733,
733 (2000).
4.
See, e.g., THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE (Regency Enterprises 1997) (portraying an attorney
who is offered a job by a high profile law firm run by the devil); LIAR LIAR (Universal Pictures
1997) (portraying a successful attorney who is forced to be truthful for twenty-four hours);
RUNAWAY JURY (Regency Enterprises 2003) (portraying litigation involving an unethical jury
consultant).
5.
See, e.g., Gary A. Hengstler & R. William Ide III, Vox Populi; The Public Perception
of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 A.B.A. J. 60 (1993); David W. Moore, Nurses Top List in Honesty
and
Ethics
Poll,
GALLUP
NEWS
SERV.
(Dec.
7,
2004),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14236/nurses-top-list-honesty-ethics-poll.aspx (placing lawyers
nineteenth of twenty-one professions with respect to honesty and ethical standards); Sarah
Parikh, Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, 2002 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG.
8, 18, available at http://www.cliffordlaw.com/abaillinoisstatedelegate/publicperceptions1.pdf.
6.
See, e.g., A.B.A. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., 2010 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE
SYSTEMS
(S.O.L.D.)
1–35
(2010),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2010_s
old_finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf (collecting statistics relating to attorney discipline).
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child abusers,7 allowing corporate employers to pay illegal bribes8 or
commit fraudulent acts,9 hiding or destroying evidence,10 lying in
negotiations,11 mishandling prosecutions,12 or representing clients in the

7.
See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 225, 247–54 (2006) (discussing role of church attorneys in defending Catholic priests
accused of sexual misconduct); Michael Rubinkam, Testimony at Sandusky Trial Shows Missed
Chances, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2012, 1:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huffwires/20120616/us-penn-state-abuse-under-their-noses (describing district attorney’s decision
not to charge Jerry Sandusky over a 1998 molestation allegation).
8.
See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed up by Walmart After Top-Level
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at A1; cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–
95 (1981) (discussing Upjohn Company’s self-report to the Internal Revenue Service about
questionable payments by a subsidiary to a foreign government).
9.
See, e.g., Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at app. C, In re
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG), 2003 WL 25544836 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003),
available at http://www.concernedshareholders.com/CCS_ENRON_Report.pdf (finding
“sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that certain of Enron’s attorneys . .
. aided and abetted the Enron officers’ breaches of fiduciary duty”). See generally NANCY B.
RAPOPORT ET AL., ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER
(2d ed. 2009); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 1167, 1170–71 (2005) (describing role of Enron attorneys); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality
of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 985
(2005).
10. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CV1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL
66932, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (discussing attorneys’ failure to produce 46,000 “critical”
documents in a major lawsuit); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., No.
CA 03-5045 A1, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (granting default judgment to
plaintiff on ground that attorneys for Morgan Stanley egregiously failed to produce requested
computer disk drives); OFF. OF PROF’L RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN UNITED STATES V. THEODORE F. STEVENS,
CRIM.
NO.
08-231
(D.D.C.
2009)
(EGS)
(2011),
available
at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/052412-081511Report.pdf (detailing investigation
into alleged prosecutorial misconduct); Walter Kiechel III, The Strange Case of Kodak’s
Lawyers, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 188 (describing failure to turn over a suitcase containing
documents relied upon by expert witness).
11. See, e.g., Art Hinshaw et al., Attorneys and Negotiation Ethics: A Material
Misunderstanding?, 29 NEGOT. J. 265 (2013) (reporting that a substantial minority of practicing
attorneys engaged in unethical or even fraudulent behavior in experimental settings); Art
Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attorney Negotiation
Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 148 (2011) (finding that attorneys are willing to violate
the requirements of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 governing legal
negotiations).
12. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 183–86 (2007); Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Is
Disbarred
for
Ethics
Breaches,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
16,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/us/16cnd-nifong.html; cf. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.
Ct. 1350, 1355 (2011) (finding that although prosecutor’s office failed to disclose an
exculpatory crime report, plaintiff failed to make sufficient showing of “deliberate indifference”
for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See generally Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the
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face of seemingly obvious conflicts of interest.13 By perusing bar
disciplinary records one would also learn about a myriad of less
newsworthy but nonetheless important ethical violations—failure to
communicate with clients, neglect of client matters, failure to provide
competent representation, and misuse of client trust funds.14 Whether one is
most concerned with some lawyers’ failure to comply with even minimal
ethical rules, or whether one advocates that lawyers hold themselves to
higher standards, one will likely be disturbed by such reports.15
A survey by the American Bar Association found that 118,054 ethics
complaints were made against U.S. lawyers in 2010.16 Of course, such
Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2011).
13. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER
1–12 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2004) (discussing attorney who was sentenced to prison for making
false affidavits hiding conflict of interest). In addition, one might identify more politically
controversial examples. See Patrick Gavin, PBS Documentary Looks at Bill Clinton’s Career,
POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71382.html
(reviewing documentary discussing President Clinton’s sexual dalliances and his subsequent
dishonesty regarding those dalliances). See generally David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of
Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007); see also W. Bradley Wendel,
Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: The 2008 F.W. Wickwire Memorial Lecture, 31
DALHOUSIE L.J. 247, 265 (2009) (urging that the arguments relied upon by Bush administration
attorneys to justify harsh inquisition tactics were so far outside the range of reasonable as to be
considered unethical).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (concerning Client-Lawyer
Relationship); see Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of
Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 259–60 (2012) (reporting that the most
common disciplinary complaints made against attorneys involve neglect and lack of
communication); Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The
Everyday Ethics of Defense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 754 (1998) (“It is difficult to
comprehend and define the extraordinary violations without understanding the ordinary ethical
issues that practicing lawyers routinely confront and resolve in their everyday professional life.
Focusing on the tail of the distribution of ethical conduct tells us little (as the use and misuse of
horror stories starkly demonstrates) about the dominant value system that informs everyday
conduct.”). Lawyers may also act in a variety of other ways that may be considered unethical or
otherwise inappropriate. For example, they may make decisions that are discriminatory, take
undue credit for joint work, or treat others with disrespect.
15. In this Article, we neither take a position on what ethical standards ought to be applied
to attorneys, nor on how ethical misconduct ought to be sanctioned. Instead, our goal is to
educate attorneys and legal organizations on how best to fulfill their own ethical goals. Cf.
Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Research
Paper No. 13-31, Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2320605 (urging that
legal ethical rules ought to be made clearer and less discretionary in light of our inability to
maintain objectivity while maintaining partisan positions).
16. A.B.A. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., supra note 6 (surveying lawyer disciplinary agencies
across the 50 states). In 2010, there were approximately 1.4 million licensed attorneys in the
U.S., 73,240 complaints against lawyers were investigated, and 5,241 lawyers were charged
with an ethics violation following a probable cause determination. Id.
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complaints are both over and under inclusive as a measure of attorneys’
ethical misconduct. Some complaints may make allegations that are
unfounded. Conversely, much misconduct may never be discovered or
reported. Still, the anecdotes, press reports, and ethical complaints suggest
that there is reason for concern.
Concerns about ethics cut across all sizes and types of practice. While
lawyers at smaller firms tend to be disciplined by the Bar more often than
attorneys who practice at larger or more prestigious firms,17 it is by no
means clear that small firm lawyers are inherently less ethical. 18 Indeed, it is
evident that attorneys at some of the biggest and most respected firms
sometimes commit serious ethical infractions—lying in affidavits,19 failing
to produce discovery,20 helping their client’s officers breach their fiduciary
duties,21 and other ethical improprieties.22 Ethical missteps reach all levels
of prominence. Indeed, two former U.S. presidents (Richard Nixon and Bill
Clinton) were disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.23
Ethical problems afflict criminal attorneys as well as those handling civil
cases. Prosecutors have been found to have committed ethical violations
such as concealing exculpatory evidence, knowingly presenting false
testimony, misleading witnesses, or continuing to prosecute criminals after
17. Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 312 (2004).
18. See Brown & Wolf, supra note 14, at 260 (noting that the “higher claim rate [against
solo and small firm practitioners] appears to stem . . . from challenges that are specific to small
scale practice: a client base composed primarily of individuals rather than institutions, lower
average hourly billing rates, and a high volume of clients to balance lower rates.”); Levin, supra
note 17, at 387 (noting that many solo and small firm lawyers are “overwhelmed by their
financial circumstances or caseloads”). It may also be true that the Bar comes down harder on
attorneys at smaller or solo firms. Levin, supra note 17, at 314 (“It may be easier for underfinanced discipline systems to successfully prosecute cases against solo or small firm
practitioners—who have fewer resources to defend against these complaints.”).
19. REGAN, supra note 13, at 1, 3 (describing John Gellene from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley
& McCloy).
20. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CV1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *16
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (involving attorneys from Heller Ehrman LLP); Kiechel, supra note 10
(describing lawyers at Donovan Leisure who hid documents).
21. Final Report of Neal Batson, supra note 9, at 6–13; see also Robert W. Gordon, A New
Role for Lawyers? The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2003)
(observing that Enron lawyers from Vinson & Elkins facilitated flawed transactions).
22. See Symposium, In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler: A
Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyers’ Ethics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S. CALIF. L.
REV. 977, 979–84 (1993) (detailing the chronology of events leading to the Kaye, Scholer
scandal). See generally Ed Hendricks & Mary Berkheiser, Where Were the Lawyers?, 18 LITIG.
30, 30 (1992); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and
the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 243 (1998).
23. In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Neal v. Clinton, No. CIV 20005677, 2001 WL 34355768 (Ark. Cir. Jan. 19, 2001) (five-year suspension).
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DNA testing seems to show they are not guilty. 24 Similarly, criminal
defense attorneys, whether in public defenders’ or private offices, have been
found to have failed to exercise adequate diligence in representing their
clients.25
Some have suggested that lawyers behave badly because they are
inherently “bad”26 or “stupid,”27 because they are susceptible to undue
pressure from their clients,28 because they are under-regulated,29 or even
because they are over-regulated.30 Surely some attorneys do deliberately
engage in conduct that they know to be wrong in order to benefit
themselves or their client. However, psychological research suggests a more
complex story: that those who commit ethical infractions are not necessarily
“bad apples,” but are human beings. Many ethical lapses result from a
combination of situational pressures and all too human modes of thinking.31
24. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, The Use of Ethical and Unconstitutional
Practices and Policies by Prosecutors’ Offices, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (2012).
25. Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 344 (noting that “public
defenders, contract lawyers, or appointed counsel—fail to properly investigate in a substantial
number of cases”).
26. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 992
(1997) (observing that a “bad” man, who “cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed
and practised [sic] by his neighbors,” nonetheless has an incentive to obey the law in order to
avoid fines and stay out of jail).
27. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 711 (1998) (noting that lawyers often characterize
ethics violations as “isolated examples of lawyers being ‘stupid,’ that is, failing to take adequate
account of the downside risks to themselves and to their clients of rule violations”).
28. Levin, supra note 17, at 337 (discussing the ethical challenge of dealing with “a client
who wished to engage in some form of fraud”).
29. Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. PITT. L. REV.
693, 750 (2006) (advocating better use of “rulemaking to restrain the current professional
default principle of zealous advocacy”).
30. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 885–86 (1996) (arguing that typical statutory
prohibitions are likely to stifle “sentimental responsiveness, a key feature of good ethical
deliberation,” by encouraging lawyers to take a technocratic approach rather than to engage a
more virtuous approach); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct:
Saltwater for Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311, 311 (1987) (arguing that “increasing ethical
regulation may magnify troublesome problems of role morality and even impede lawyers’ moral
development”); see also Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the
Law of Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48
EMORY L.J. 1255, 1282–83 (1999) (critiquing reliance on ethical rules on grounds that they
inevitably leave too much room for discretion and discourage lawyers from thoroughly
considering how to behave when rules do not apply).
31. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded
Rationality, 2 TOPICS COGNITIVE SCI. 528, 540 (2010) (raising the concept of “ecological
morality, that is, that moral behavior results from an interaction between mind and
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The psychology we present here helps explain how ethical lapses can
occur more easily and less intentionally than we might imagine, providing
substantial insight into why attorneys sometimes behave unethically, why
attorneys may have difficulty curbing or reporting the unethical conduct of
their clients or fellow attorneys, and why it is often difficult for attorneys to
learn from their own ethical missteps and the missteps of others. It also
helps us see how, even as we make what could be considered to be
unethical decisions, we may still believe we are ethical actors. At the same
time, the psychological research also provides insight into why attorneys are
often able to resist substantial pressure to act unethically—pressure that
comes from clients, adversaries, superiors, and their own self-interest.32
While we are not the first to apply certain social science insights to the
ethical behavior of attorneys in particular settings or situations,33 this Article
environment”); Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad Barrels: MetaAnalytic Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1, 1
(2010) (finding that characteristics of the individual, the ethical issue, and the environment work
together to influence ethical decision making and behavior); Benoît Monin & Alexander H.
Jordan, The Dynamic Moral Self: A Social Psychological Perspective, in PERSONALITY,
IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 341 (Darcia Narvaez &
Daniel K. Lapsley eds., 2009). See generally BUSINESS ETHICS: SHAPING AN EMERGING FIELD
(David De Cremer & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 2011); Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets
Behavioral Law and Economics, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
(Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., forthcoming); Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino,
Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85 (2012); Michael Bommer et al., A Behavioral Model of Ethical and
Unethical Decision Making, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 265 (1987); Celia Moore et al., Why Employees
Do Bad Things: Moral Disengagement and Unethical Organizational Behavior, 65 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 1 (2012) (developing a measure of an individual’s propensity to morally disengage);
Linda Klebe Trevino, Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation
Interactionist Model, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601 (1986).
32. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 17, at 337 (describing how attorneys report resisting
pressures to act unethically).
33. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons
of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006) (prosecutors); Burke, supra note 12
(prosecutors); Eldred, supra note 25 (criminal defense lawyers); Kath Hall & Vivien Holmes,
The Power of Rationalisation to Influence Lawyers’ Decisions to Act Unethically, 11 LEGAL
ETHICS 137 (2009) (in-house counsel); Kim, supra note 9 (in-house counsel); Kimberly
Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631
(2005) (attorneys in large firms); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A
Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75
(1993) (corporate counsel); Levin, supra note 17 (small and solo law firm practitioners);
Gregory S. McNeal, Organizational Culture, Professional Ethics and Guantánamo, 42 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 125 (2009) (military attorneys); Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a
Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to
Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
773 (1998) (large firm litigators); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate
Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451 (2007); Cassandra Burke
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is the first to provide a comprehensive survey of the implications of
psychology for legal ethics. In addition, we provide detailed suggestions
about how individuals, attorneys, and legal organizations can improve
attorneys’ ethics across practice areas and settings.
In Part I of the Article we examine the ethical blind spots, slippery
slopes, and “ethical fading” that may lead good people to behave badly.
These insights may offer some comfort—suggesting that there are not as
many inherently bad people (or lawyers) in the world as we might have
believed. But this psychologically rich understanding also raises concerns,
because it implies that all of us are in danger of behaving unethically should
the right (or wrong) circumstances present themselves.
The nature of legal practice means that lawyers face a set of particularly
difficult challenges. Part II explains that complex and ambiguous ethical
rules and standards, agency relationships, the ethos of the adversarial
system, the pressures of modern legal practice, positions or feelings of
relative status or power, and cues or pressure from others are all
characteristics of the practice of law that attorneys need to pay attention to
if they want to avoid crossing ethical lines.34
In Part III, we examine why it is difficult to recognize and learn from
ethical lapses. Unfortunately, the same kinds of psychological phenomena
that can make it hard for lawyers to notice and avoid ethical issues in the
first instance also make it difficult for them to identify and learn from
ethical mistakes.
Finally, in Part IV, we draw on the psychological research to make some
suggestions for how individual attorneys and legal employers can enhance
their ethics.35 While in the end, we do not pretend to offer complete

Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and
Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389 (2009) (government lawyers); see also
Lawrence J. Fox, I’m Just an Associate . . . At a New York Firm, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 939,
939–53 (2000) (recounting fictional story of an associate who is instructed by a senior partner to
engage in unethical behavior).
34. We also recognize that many ethical improprieties within the profession are related to
drug or alcohol issues or mental health problems. While these issues are important, and may
relate in part to the stresses we identify, they are not our focus. See, e.g., Sheila Blackford,
Dealing
with
Impaired
Attorneys,
LAW
PRAC.
TODAY
(June
2009),
http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/pma06091.shtml (noting that impaired lawyers “are
frequently the subject of ethics complaints for not communicating with clients and neglecting
legal matters”); MICHAEL A. BEDKE & JOHN W. KEEGAN, A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIV., COMM’N
ON IMPAIRED ATTORNEYS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ¶ I (1995) (reporting estimates
that a substantial proportion of lawyer discipline cases are related to impairment).
35. While the psychology we review here surely has implications for the content of the
rules of professional conduct as well, we do not address those implications here. Instead, we
take as a given the legal and regulatory structure governing professional conduct and explore
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solutions that will ensure attorneys’ ethical behavior, we do hope that our
psychological lens will help equip lawyers to better resist the temptations of
unethical conduct.
I.

BOUNDED ETHICALITY

Ethical lapses occur more easily and less intentionally than we might
imagine. While most of us desire to act ethically,36 “psychological processes
. . . [can] lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are
inconsistent with their own preferred ethics.”37
As an initial example, consider the downfall of prominent bankruptcy
attorney John Gellene, as described by Milton Regan in the book Eat What
You Kill.38 Gellene, a “bankruptcy partner at the prestigious Wall Street law
firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. . . . was regarded as one of the
best bankruptcy lawyers in the country, and had worked on some of the
largest corporate reorganizations in the world.”39 In the mid-1990s, Gellene
and Milbank represented Bucyrus-Erie, a manufacturer of mining tools, as it
reorganized in bankruptcy. Following the bankruptcy proceedings, BucyrusErie was healthy enough to be purchased by “a large private investment
partnership.”40 But the Bucyrus-Erie bankruptcy would not turn out so
successfully for Gellene, who ended up in jail.41
[Gellene had originally] been asked by powerful Milbank partner
Larry Lederman to provide his services to Bucyrus because of
Gellene’s experience in bankruptcy and financial restructuring.
Lederman had advised Bucyrus off and on for five years. He also
had provided legal guidance for several years to investment banker
Mikael Salovaara. Salovaara had furnished financial advice to
Bucyrus over the same five-year period. He was a former
Goldman Sachs partner who had recently left the firm with a
colleague to establish an investment fund known as South Street.
the implications of behavioral ethics for individual attorneys and their employers within the
existing regulatory context.
36. See Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept
Maintenance, 45 J. MKTG. RES. 633, 634 (2008) (arguing that people strive to maintain a selfconcept that includes honesty).
37. MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING
123 (7th ed. 2008); see also C. Daniel Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to
Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 525 (1999) (“Moral
people often fail to act morally.”).
38. See REGAN, supra note 13, at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 287.
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In 1992, South Street had advanced $35 million to Bucyrus in
return for a lien on all the company’s manufacturing equipment.
As the company’s major secured creditor, South Street would be
first in line to be paid if Bucyrus filed for bankruptcy. . . .
[In applying to be appointed as Bucyrus-Erie’s counsel,] Gellene
was required under Bankruptcy Rule 2014 to list his and
Milbank’s connections with any party in interest in the
bankruptcy. At the time, Milbank also was representing Mikael
Salovaara on one matter and South Street on another. Gellene
himself was the lead counsel in the South Street matter, although
he had done very little work on the case. The work for Salovaara
and South Street created a potential conflict of interest for the law
firm. As counsel for Bucyrus in its bankruptcy, Milbank would
represent a debtor that had a duty to treat fairly all parties with a
claim on its assets. As counsel for Salovaara and South Street,
Milbank might have an incentive to provide advice to Bucyrus that
favored South Street over other creditors.
[But] Gellene didn’t disclose these Milbank ties to Salovaara when
he submitted the affidavits that accompanied his application.42

When Milbank’s ties to Salovaara and South Street were eventually
uncovered, the firm was required to return the $1.86 million in fees that it
had earned in the bankruptcy case and settled a professional malpractice suit
for between $27 and $50 million.43 For his part, Gellene was charged with
and convicted of violating Bankruptcy Rule 2014 for “making false
declarations in the affidavits he had submitted to [the judge and] . . . for
using a false affidavit under oath to claim that Milbank was eligible to
receive payment for its work on the bankruptcy.”44 He was sentenced to 15
months in prison and a $15,000 fine.45 How did John Gellene fall so far and
so hard?
It is wishful thinking to assume that only “bad apples”—people who
differ from us in important ways—will make unethical decisions:
In our conventional way of thinking about ourselves, we
are confident that we would know in advance that to do some set
of actions would be morally wrong, and that this realization,

42. Id. at 2–3.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1–3, 287; see also Nancy B. Rapoport, The Curious Incident of the Law Firm
That Did Nothing in the Night-Time, 10 LEGAL ETHICS 98, 98–114 (2007) (reviewing REGAN,
supra note 13).
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occurring prior to the actions, would prevent us from taking them.
These comforting thoughts turn out to be not true.46

Instead, we will see that many psychological phenomena contribute to
decisions to act unethically and make it challenging to identify and
appropriately respond to the ethical lapses of others—including colleagues
and clients.
A.

Ethical Blindspots

Unethical decisions are more likely when the decision maker does not
see the decision at hand as involving ethical issues or when she believes that
any potential ethical challenges can easily be overcome. Each of us tends to
believe that we see the world objectively;47 to see ourselves as more fair,
unbiased, competent, and deserving than average;48 and to be overconfident
about our abilities and prospects.49 This tendency to view the self in positive
terms is heightened when the characteristic at issue is socially desirable—as
is the case with ethical behavior. Indeed, attorneys tend to believe that their
own ethics and their firm’s ethical standards are more stringent than those
of other attorneys and other firms.50
46. John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2005).
47. Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of
Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 793 (2004); Lee Ross & Andrew Ward,
Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in
VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 110–11 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996).
48. See, e.g., David Alain Armor, The Illusion of Objectivity: A Bias in the Perception of
Freedom from Bias (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Los
Angeles); Scott T. Allison et al., On Being Better but not Smarter Than Others: The Muhammad
Ali Effect, 7 SOC. COGNITION 275, 291 (1989); Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling
“Holier Than Thou”: Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social
Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 861, 861 (2000); Roderick M. Kramer et al.,
Self-Enhancement Biases and Negotiator Judgment: Effects of Self-Esteem and Mood, 56
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 110, 124 (1993); Wim B.G. Liebrand
et al., Why We Are Fairer Than Others: A Cross-Cultural Replication and Extension, 22 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 590 (1986); David M. Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than
Others, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 480 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Roger Buehler et al., The Planning Fallacy: Cognitive, Motivational, and
Social Origins, 43 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 8 (2010); Jane GoodmanDelahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 133, 144–45 (2010); Don A. Moore & Paul J. Healy, The Trouble
With Overconfidence, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 502, 502 (2008).
50. Jonathan R.B. Halbesleben et al., The Role of Pluralistic Ignorance in Perceptions of
Unethical Behavior: An Investigation of Attorneys’ and Students’ Perceptions of Ethical
Behavior, 14 ETHICS & BEHAV. 17, 18 (2004). With regard to attorneys’ views of their firms,
see Gordon, supra note 27; Messikomer, supra note 14; Nelson, supra note 33.

45:1107]

BEHAVIORAL LEGAL ETHICS

1117

These views of the self can lead to an ethical blind spot that impedes our
ability to perceive and thoughtfully consider the ethical tensions we
inevitably face.51 If we are objective, fair, and unbiased, then we need not be
concerned that we might take unfair advantage of another or unfairly
privilege one person or position over another. If we are competent, then we
need not question our ability to act or decide appropriately. If we are
deserving, then any benefits we receive must be warranted. If we do not
realize that our judgments of fairness are influenced by our own interests,
then we do not need to be on guard against such conflicts.52 And if we are
overconfident—in our own ethical judgment, or in our ability to fix or
otherwise manage ethical problems—then we are unlikely to stop and think
carefully about a decision or to revisit that decision later.
In addition, people commonly make inaccurate forecasts of their own
future emotions and behavior—and, thus, may predict that they will act
ethically when this is not necessarily so.53 It is clear that in the heat of the
moment, we respond to a variety of incentives and practical forces. 54 We
want to impress (or at least not disappoint) the client by reaching the
settlement, getting the contract signed, or winning the case. We want to be

51. Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing
Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS,
LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 80 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005). See generally
Pronin et al., supra note 47; Richard F. West et al., Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate
the Bias Blind Spot, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 506 (2012).
52. Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 171, 181–
82 (2004).
53. See, e.g., Kristina A. Diekmann et al., From Self-Prediction to Self-Defeat: Behavioral
Forecasting, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, and the Effect of Competitive Expectations, 85 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 672, 674 (2003) (finding that people mis-predict their behavior
in negotiation); Oriel Feldman Hall et al., What We Say and What We Do: The Relationship
Between Real and Hypothetical Moral Choices, 123 COGNITION 434, 438 (2012); Janet K.
Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse Me—What Did You Just Say?! Women’s Public and Private
Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 83 (1999); Julie A.
Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined Gender Harassment, 57 J. SOC.
ISSUES 15, 24 (2001) (finding that people mispredict their response to inappropriate interview
questions). See generally Emily Balcetis & David A. Dunning, A Mile in Moccasins: How
Situational Experience Diminishes Dispositionism in Social Inference, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 102 (2008); Buehler et al., supra note 49 (finding that people predict they will
get projects done more quickly than they do).
54. Karl Aquino et al., Testing a Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behavior: The
Interactive Influence of Situations and Moral Identity Centrality, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 123, 131 (2009); Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Misrepresentation and Expectations of
Misrepresentation in an Ethical Dilemma: The Role of Incentives and Temptation, 41 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 330, 334–35 (1998) (finding that incentives increase temptation and also the
likelihood of acting on temptation); see also Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences,
95 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 391 (2005).
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seen (and to see ourselves) as competent.55 Members of a firm don’t want to
act against the culture of the firm,56 or put their promotion or job at risk.57
Decision makers feel pressure to make decisions quickly and efficiently.
But when we are predicting our future behavior, we focus on our idealistic
self—the self that “places principles and values above practical
considerations and seeks to express the person’s sense of true self.” 58 With
this ideal self in mind, abstract ethical considerations, rather than situational
pressures, tend to be our focus and we anticipate that we will act ethically.
When the time horizon shortens and we are in the moment, our attention
shifts to our pragmatic self—the self that is “primarily guided by practical
concerns” and is likely to seize opportunity, act impulsively, and focus on
the pragmatics of the situation.59
B.

Slippery Slopes and Boiling Frogs

Another factor that can contribute to our bounded ethics is that the path
to unethical conduct often runs along a slippery slope. Just as it is
frequently extremely difficult for people to visually detect changes in their
environment,60 so can it be quite difficult to notice when conduct degrades
gradually. Psychologist Stanley Milgram famously found that people would
follow the instructions of an experimenter to administer slightly
55. Dennis J. Moberg, Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations: How Systematic Errors in
Person Perception Undermine Moral Agency, 27 ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 413, 417 (2006).
56. See, e.g., Kirkland, supra note 33, at 705 (noting that lawyers are affected by the
“logic of their firms”).
57. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (refusing to grant First
Amendment protection to deputy district attorney who alleged he was denied a promotion after
criticizing the legitimacy of a warrant); see also Fox, supra note 33, at 949 (discussing fears of
junior associate who knew he ought to report partner’s unethical conduct).
58. Yifat Kivetz & Tom R. Tyler, Tomorrow I’ll Be Me: The Effect of Time Perspective on
the Activation of Idealistic Versus Pragmatic Selves, 102 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 193, 193 (2007).
59. Id.; see also Hal E. Hershfield et al., Short Horizons and Tempting Situations: Lack of
Continuity to Our Future Selves Leads to Unethical Decision Making and Behavior, 117
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 298, 303 (2012) (finding that feeling
continuous with and able to imagine one’s future self makes future consequences more
prominent and decreases unethical behavior); Daniel Read et al., Mixing Virtue and Vice:
Combining the Immediacy Effect and the Diversification Heuristic, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 257, 258 (1999); Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 PSYCHOL.
REV. 403, 403 (2003). More generally, taking a broad perspective is less likely to result in
unethical behavior than is a narrow perspective that focuses on individual decisions in isolation.
Amos Schurr et al., Is That the Answer You Had In Mind? The Effect of Perspective on
Unethical Behavior, 7 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 679, 679 (2012).
60. See, e.g., Daniel J. Simons et al., Change Blindness in the Absence of a Visual
Disruption, 29 PERCEPTION 1143, 1143 (2000).
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increasingly severe shocks to another person, ostensibly as part of an
experiment on punishment and learning.61 The step-by-step nature of the
shift may be one reason why so many people (63% of participants) ended
up being willing to administer shocks that elicited increasingly “desperate”
cries of pain to the point that the other person became seemingly nonresponsive.62 It seems that the gradual intensification of the shock made it
difficult for participants to determine precisely when they were being asked
to cross the line. This ride down the slippery ethics slope turns out to be a
bit like the apocryphal story about how to boil frogs: “Folk wisdom says
that if you throw a frog in boiling water, it will jump out. But if you put a
frog in nice warm water and slowly raise the temperature, by the time the
frog realizes the water has become too hot, it will already be cooked.”63
Early decisions may be made in circumstances in which the ethical
course of action is not clear. Wanting to believe that the small steps we have
already taken have been good ones and preferring to act in ways that are
consistent with our previous behavior,64 we find it difficult to shift course.
Eventually, as a practice becomes routine, the points at which deliberation
might have occurred disappear, as do the decision’s ethical contours.65
“Over time, people become more comfortable pushing the boundaries of
professional propriety, and they also find themselves having to continue
previous courses of action in order to avoid admitting that their earlier
actions were improper.”66

61. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 123 (1974); see also Jerry M. Burger,
Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 1, 8 (2009)
(attempting to partially replicate Milgram’s study and obtaining similar results).
62. Burger, supra note 61, at 8.
63. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 37, at 48; see also Francesca Gino & Max H.
Bazerman, When Misconduct Goes Unnoticed: The Acceptability of Gradual Erosion in Others’
Unethical Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 708, 717 (2009).
64. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 52 (5th ed. 2009).
65. See Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in
Organizations, 25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 3 (2003); Linda K. Treviño et al.,
Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951, 970 (2006). See generally
HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE 18 (1989).
66. Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology
of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 196 (2004); see also Michael Guttentag,
Stumbling into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Accounting Fraud, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 204 (Alon Harel & Keith Hylton eds., 2011);
Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the
Financial Crisis (Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper, No. 11-135, 2011),
available
at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1156&context=fwps_papers
(noting that “by the time reality starts to set in, our complicity is set as well”).
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Ethical Fading

Ethical blindspots and the contours of the slippery slope contribute to a
process of ethical fading or moral disengagement in which decision makers
“do not ‘see’ the moral components of an ethical decision, not so much
because they are morally uneducated, but because psychological processes
fade the ‘ethics’ from an ethical dilemma.”67 A variety of additional
psychological processes also play a role in fading ethical considerations
from view, making unethical decisions more likely.
For example, the scripts—knowledge structures that guide our
understanding of how events typically unfold—that govern a particular
situation may determine whether or not ethical considerations are taken into
account.68 One “may approach a particular [decision] with a script that has
moral content, triggering moral judgment processes, or with one that is
devoid of moral content, triggering non-moral judgment processes.”69 The
relevant script may characterize a particular decision—such as whether a
conflict is an obstacle to taking on representation of a new client—as a
business decision as opposed to an ethical decision, fading the ethical
implications from view.70 Consider the Ford Pinto. The Pinto’s gas tank was
67. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception
in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 224 (2004); see also Albert Bandura, Moral
Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities, 3 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV.
193, 193 (1999); James R. Detert et al., Moral Disengagement in Ethical Decision Making: A
Study of Antecedents and Outcomes, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 374, 374 (2008); Moore et al.,
supra note 31, at 2.
68. See Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 715, 715 (1981).
69. Kenneth D. Butterfield et al., Moral Awareness in Business Organizations: Influences
of Issue-Related and Social Context Factors, 53 HUM. REL. 981, 989 (2000).
70. See id.; Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67. Aspects of a situation can evoke
business or competitive norms. See, e.g., Aaron C. Kay et al., Material Priming: The Influence
of Mundane Physical Objects on Situational Construal and Competitive Behavioral Choice, 95
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 83 (2004) (finding that those primed
with things associated with business tend to act less cooperatively); Maryam Kouchaki et al.,
Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to Money Triggers a Business Decision Frame and Unethical
Outcomes, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 53 (2013); Kathleen D.
Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCI. 1154, 1154 (2006) (finding
that when reminded of money, people tend to behave more selfishly); Francesca Gino & Lamar
Pierce, The Abundance Effect: Unethical Behavior in the Presence of Wealth, 109
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 142, 142 (2009); see also Qing Yang
et al., Diverging Effects of Clean Versus Dirty Money on Attitudes, Values, and Interpersonal
Behavior, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 473, 473 (2013). For evidence that clearing
conflicts is often thought of as a business, rather than an ethical, decision, see Kimberly
Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms at Work in Large US Law Firms:
The Role of Ethics Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 181, 181 (2008). More generally, legal rules or
practices may cue moral intuitions in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter & Stephan W.
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susceptible to rupture and burst into flames in slow-speed crashes. Observe
how Ford’s Field Recall Coordinator describes his reaction to early reports
of fires involving the Pinto:
My cue for labeling a case as a problem either required
high frequencies of occurrence or directly-traceable causes. I had
little time for speculative contemplation on potential problems that
did not fit a pattern that suggested known courses of action leading
to possible recall. . . . I remember no strong ethical overtones to
the case whatsoever. It was a very straightforward decision, driven
by dominant scripts for the time, place, and context.71

The early reports of Pintos “lighting up” did not fit the Coordinator’s
schema for what a problem would look like—these reports “trickle[d] in”
and “did not fit the pattern of recallable standards; the evidence was not
overwhelming that the car was defective in some way.” Accordingly, the
ethical dimensions of the decision about whether to recall were not focal in
his mind.72
This account is consistent with lawyers’ frequent reactions to discussions
of ethics. In interviews, lawyers’ responses
suggest[] that they simply did not think very much about legal
ethics or that they did not consider the issues they confronted in
moral or ethical terms. One lawyer explained that he did not
confront ethical issues because “when you’re dealing with big
companies, it doesn’t seem to come up.” . . . In some cases
lawyers appeared to be so acculturated to certain practices they did
not consider the ethical issues implicated by those practices.73

Certain routine decisions or practices—providing competent services,
maintaining sufficient support staff, or communicating with clients—may
not be thought of as raising ethical issues in the same ways as more
egregious behaviors, such as fraudulent misrepresentation or sleeping with a
client.74 But, these practices are covered by the formal rules of ethics 75 and
Tontrup, How Law Frames Moral Intuitions: The Expressive Effect of Specific Performance, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 673 (2012); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 1 (2000); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral
Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 405, 405 (2009).
71. Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed
Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 381–82, 388 (1992).
72. Id. at 380; see also Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977,
available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness.
73. Levin, supra note 17, at 336 (citation omitted).
74. See, e.g., id. at 336 (finding that attorneys were unlikely to raise such routine issues in
discussions of ethics).
75. See infra note 91.
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tend to comprise a significant proportion of the complaints made to bar
disciplinary authorities.76
Along these same lines, the language that we use to describe a particular
act or decision can mask its ethical contours. Euphemisms—such as friendly
fire, collateral damage, downsizing, strategic misrepresentation, creative
time-keeping, bluffing, decedent, a case with bad facts, or Ford Pintos
lighting up—can strip the decision of much of its ethical content.77 These
effects of language can even be seen in the ways that lawyers prefer to talk
about ethical issues. Lawyers tend to shy away from labeling behavior as
“misconduct,” and are seemingly more comfortable discussing issues
involving “gray areas” or “incivility.”78
This minimizing of the ethical implications of an act is also seen in the
ways that we compare the act to other real or hypothetical acts. One might
be able to construct a tenuous justification for the unethical act. 79 And, it is
usually possible to imagine instances of behavior that are worse than the act
at issue and such advantageous comparisons can be used to cast a particular
decision in a more positive light.80 Indeed, this sort of comparison is
common among lawyers who have been disciplined for ethical breaches,
with lawyers pointing to more egregious breaches than those with which
they are charged.81
The perceived moral intensity of a decision can also be influenced by the
ease with which the nature, magnitude, probability, and timing of any
potential consequences can be drawn to mind.82 For example, decisions are
seen as more unethical when they result in observable harm (the outcome

76. See supra note 14.
77. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67, at 226; see also Bandura, supra note 67, at 195;
William Safire, The Fine Art of Euphemism, S.F. SUN. EXAMINER & CHRON., May 13, 1979, at
34.
78. Messikomer, supra note 14, at 742; see also RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE
DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 101 (2008) (noting disciplined
lawyer’s argument that he “was guilty of ‘mistakes,’ not ‘professional misconduct.’”).
79. See Shaul Shalvi et al., Justified Ethicality: Observing Desired Counterfactuals
Modifies Ethical Perceptions and Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 181, 181 (2011); see also Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, The Dark Side of
Creativity: Original Thinkers Can Be More Dishonest, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
445, 446 (2012); Shaul Shalvi et al., Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications), 23
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1264, 1264 (2012).
80. See Bandura, supra note 67, at 196.
81. ABEL, supra note 78, at 32, 200.
82. This is an instance of the availability heuristic. When particular information is
available or accessible in memory, it has a greater influence on judgments and decisions. See,
e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
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bias)83 and when they harm identifiable victims.84 In contrast, when harm is
perceived as less likely to occur or more removed in time, the decision will
feel less ethically fraught.85
Decision makers are also more likely to engage in a range of unethical
behaviors when facing a decision that is framed as a loss than when the
same decision is framed as a gain.86 For instance, professional tax preparers
have been found to be more likely to approve returns containing large
deductions associated with ambiguous tax rules when they are faced with
the possibility of losing an existing client as compared to when they are in
the position of trying to develop new clients.87 In addition, decision makers
who are falling just short of reaching their goals are more likely to act
unethically (for example, to misrepresent their performance).88
Consider how this might apply to a young associate trying to meet the
firm’s billable hour requirement. Taking the billable hour requirement as
83. The outcome bias occurs when people judge the quality of a decision based on its
outcome—for example, decisions resulting in negative consequences are judged to have been
bad decisions. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation,
54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 569 (1988); Francesca Gino et al., No Harm, No
Foul: The Outcome Bias in Ethical Judgments (Harv. Bus. School, Working Paper No. 08-080,
2008).
84. Francesca Gino et al., Nameless + Harmless = Blameless: When Seemingly Irrelevant
Factors Influence Judgment of (Un)ethical Behavior, 111 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 93, 94 (2010); see also Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining
the “Identifiable Victim Effect,” 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 236 (1997).
85. Sefa Hayibor & David M Wasieleski, Effects of the Use of the Availability Heuristic
on Ethical Decision-Making in Organizations, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 151, 153 (2009); see also
Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 5.
86. Jessica S. Cameron & Dale T. Miller, Ethical Standards in Gain Versus Loss Frames,
in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING 91 (David De
Cremer ed., 2009); Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh, Bounded Ethicality: The Perils of Loss
Framing, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 378, 378 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 119 (1996) (Study 2); Christopher P. Reinders
Folmer & David De Cremer, Bad for Me or Bad for Us? Interpersonal Orientations and the
Impact of Losses on Unethical Behavior, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 760, 766–77
(2012) (exploring moderators of the effect of loss frame on ethics); see also Francesca Gino &
Joshua D. Margolis, Bringing Ethics Into Focus: How Regulatory Focus and Risk Preferences
Influence (Un)Ethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
145, 147 (2011); see generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, &
Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343–44 (1984).
87. Kaye J. Newberry et al., An Examination of Tax Practitioner Decisions: The Role of
Preparer Sanctions and Framing Effects Associated with Client Condition, 14 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 439, 441 (1993); see also Henry S. J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity
as Determinants of Tax Cheating: An International Experimental Study, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
341, 344–45 (1990); Elizabeth F. Loftus, To File, Perchance to Cheat, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr.
1985, at 35, 37–38.
88. Maurice E. Schweitzer et al., Goal Setting as a Motivator of Unethical Behavior, 47
ACAD. MGMT. J. 422, 422 (2004).
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the relevant reference point, the associate may fall just short and may
perceive this failure as a loss.89 Both of these features of the situation tend
to increase the likelihood of unethical behavior. Similarly, a client and
lawyer who are engaged in selling an unsuccessful business90 are likely to
find themselves in a loss frame and at greater risk of unethical behavior. By
the same token, once one has stumbled into an unethical decision,
considerations about what to do next are likely to be made in a loss frame.
One can own up to one’s unethical decision and face the negative
consequences now, or keep quiet and face a possible and uncertain loss
sometime in the future. Such a posture can make risk-seeking behavior
more likely.
II.

ETHICS IN LAW PRACTICE

The psychological tendencies that may lead people to behave unethically
can be compounded by particular aspects of legal practice. The rules
governing professional conduct, the agency relationship between attorney
and client, the role of advocate, the demands of practice, the status inherent
in the legal profession, and the social environment of the firm or practice
area can all influence how lawyers make decisions about issues that
implicate ethics. While we recognize that other professions face ethical
challenges as well, we think it is helpful to focus on those aspects of law
practice that are most likely to influence attorneys.
A.

Ethical Rules and Standards

The regulation of lawyers’ professional conduct draws on rules and
norms from a variety of sources. Attorneys are, of course, regulated by the
rules of professional conduct adopted in their own jurisdiction. These rules
typically cover, for example, conflicts of interest, veracity, confidentiality,
advertising, billing, trust funds, and sex with clients.91 Ethical constraints in
particular contexts are also sometimes set out in statutes or regulations. For
example, statutory provisions governing wiretapping,92 corporate

89. Cameron & Miller, supra note 86, at 102–03.
90. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers’ Rules, Auditors’ Rules and the Psychology of
Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1417–18 (2000).
91. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009) (Conflict of Interest: Current
Clients); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2010) (Candor Toward the Tribunal); CAL.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400 (2012) (Advertising and Solicitation).
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006).
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accountability,93 and foreign corruption94 require particular disclosures,
proscribe certain behavior, or seek to hold lawyers accountable in other
ways. Court rules regarding evidence, discovery, and other matters provide
additional regulation.95
While abundant, the ethical rules governing attorneys leave many gaps,
and can be ambiguous and even conflicting.96 In addition, many of these
rules articulate a minimum standard of conduct that must be supplemented
with guidance from one’s own internal moral code.97 The frequent opacity
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is attributable, at least in part,
to the potential for intense tension between the duty to diligently represent
one’s client and duties to opponents, to the public at large, or to the judicial
system.98 While the Prologue to the Model Rules contemplates that these
various responsibilities “are usually harmonious,”99 it also recognizes that
“[v]irtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s
own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory
living.”100 The Rules endeavor to resolve these conflicts when possible, but
also provide that often “[s]uch issues must be resolved through the exercise
93. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
94. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
95. Recall that John Gellene, the attorney in our opening example, was tripped up by
Bankruptcy Rule 2014. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014 (requiring “a verified statement of the
person to be employed setting forth the person’s connections with the debtor, creditors, any
other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or
any person employed in the office of the United States trustee”). See generally Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73
(2009) (discussing different forms of lawyer regulation).
96. See Wendel, supra note 9, at 1168 (arguing that the rules can never be completely
clear).
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE (2010) (noting the
importance of a lawyer’s “personal conscience” as a guide to professional responsibility and
observing that the “Rules do not . . . exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules”);
see also Suchman, infra note 101, at 837 (“[A]n ethical profession requires more than just
professional ethics. It requires a sense of right and wrong . . . that rises above the letter of the
rules . . . [and] a set of social structures for creating, preserving, and transmitting this
understanding in the face of real-world challenges.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 541 (2009) (arguing that “the very structure of the codes is to
provide a framework under which lawyers can and will act as ordinary moral individuals”).
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PROLOGUE (2010) (“A lawyer, as a member of the
legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”).
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also Keith Leavitt et al., Different Hats, Different Obligations: Plural
Occupational Identities and Situated Moral Judgments, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1316 (2012)
(exploring the effects on moral judgment of different occupational identities and roles).

1126

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles
underlying the Rules.”101
Resolving such ambiguities is particularly challenging because while
laudable values can underlie good behavior, they can also motivate
unethical behavior.102 And, lawyers’ expertise at parsing rules, paying
attention to exceptions and loopholes, interpreting text, and making
arguments on both sides of an issue, while commendable in many ways, can
also be problematic in this context.103 Indeed, psychologists have compared
the process of post-hoc moral reasoning to that of lawyering: “moral
reasoning is not left free to search for truth but is likely to be hired out like a
lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek confirmation of
preordained conclusions.”104 This lawyerly approach can contribute to
unethical conduct when it comes to ethical rules that specify only minimum
standards, that raise conflicting standards and gray areas, that involve
discretionary application of underlying moral principles, and that may be
supplemented by additional personal morality.
All of this is enhanced by the fact that lawyers tend to be more
comfortable talking about “rules” and “norms” and less comfortable talking
about “morality” or “values.”105 Indeed, law students conclude early on that
101. Id.; see also Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics
in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 837 (1998) (“[P]rofessional ethics must
explicitly incorporate the existence of various competing moral obligations, in a way that purely
aspirational principles . . . do not.”). Attorneys who work in transnational contexts face even
greater challenges as they will inevitably encounter conflicting rules and norms across
jurisdictions. See John Flood, Transnational Lawyering: Clients, Ethics, & Regulation, in
LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 176, 182 (Leslie C. Levin &
Lynn Mather eds., 2012).
102. Jaime D. Crowley & Michael C. Gottlieb, Objects in the Mirror are Closer Than They
Appear: A Primary Prevention Model for Ethical Decision Making, 43 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. &
PRAC. 65, 68 (2012) (“Sound values can build resiliency, but they can also function as
vulnerabilities.”); Linda J. Skitka & G. Scott Morgan, The Double Edged Sword of a Moral
State of Mind, in PERSONALITY, IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 31, at 355; Alan C. Tjeltveit & Michael C. Gottlieb, Avoiding the
Road to Ethical Disaster: Overcoming Vulnerabilities and Developing Resilience, 47
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES., PRAC., TRAINING 98, 98 (2010).
103. While the ethics rules that are applicable to other professionals may share many of the
features we have described, the particular analytical approach of lawyers may interact with the
nature of the rules to make these characteristics more problematic. This strikes us as an
interesting empirical question that would benefit from additional research.
104. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 822 (2001); see also JONAH LEHRER,
HOW WE DECIDE 173 (2009) (“When it comes to making ethical decisions, human rationality
isn’t a scientist, it’s a lawyer. This inner attorney gathers bits of evidence, post hoc
justifications, and pithy rhetoric in order to make the automatic reaction seem reasonable.”).
105. Messikomer, supra note 14, at 742; Lynn Mather & Leslie C. Levin, Why Context
Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at
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what matters is not their opinion about a matter but whether they can
articulate a credible argument, complicating their inclination to consult their
own sense of right and wrong.106 One study of lawyers’ ethics found:
When [attorneys] spoke of “doing the right thing,” they tended to
define this term as respecting some external source of authority or
opinion: the civil discovery rules, ethics codes, judges’ orders,
clients’ orders and preferences. They clearly preferred utilitarian
(cost-benefit) analysis to normative reasoning, and they exhibited
a positive allergy to moral language and an inclination to express
even the norms of basic truth telling and fairness in compliance
with the standard of some external standard or group.107

This discomfort echoes, and may stem in part from, debates over the role
that personal morality should (or should not) play in conjunction with the
lawyer’s professional duties.108 It may also encourage lawyers to take a
minimalist approach to ethics, substituting rules that may only articulate
minimum standards for thoughtful reflection on the ethical implications of a
decision.
Lawyers may also be affected by the human tendency to be less
compliant with rules or authorities that they see as illegitimate.109 Lawyers
in different specialties or communities of practice may encounter different
norms or find that particular rules fit the contours of that practice area more
or less well.110 Ethical guidelines that make sense for litigators may not fit

11; see also Suchman, supra note 101, at 844–45. Business managers, too, resist casting
decisions in moral terms. See Frederick B. Bird & James A. Waters, The Moral Muteness of
Managers, 32 CAL. MGMT. REV. 73, 73 (1989); see also Tamar A. Kreps & Benoît Monin,
“Doing Well By Doing Good”? Ambivalent Moral Framing in Organizations, 31 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 99, 102 (2011).
106. Our thanks to a law student at the Yale-Quinnipiac Dispute Resolution Workshop for
putting the problem in these terms.
107. Gordon, supra note 27, at 732.
108. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 394 (1988) (describing the
“standard conception” of the lawyer’s role as “partisanship and nonaccountability”); see
Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 501 (2011)
(describing the evolution of this debate); see also Gordon, supra note 21, at 1195 (describing
conception of the adversary role and offering an alternative role for corporate lawyers).
109. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 108 (2006); Tom R. Tyler,
Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 387
(2006)..
110. Lynn Mather & Craig McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer Conduct: The
Challenges of Divorce Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 69 (noting that the rules may “ignore the highly variable
circumstances of legal practice . . . because they must be framed at a level of generality that
crosses practice areas”).
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transactional work as well—and vice versa.111 Many solo and small firm
attorneys see certain rules as calculated to “interfere with [their] businessgetting activities” and, therefore, do not respect them.112
All of these factors can lead attorneys to adopt a situationist approach to
ethics. In discussing discovery ethics with attorneys, for example, Robert
Nelson found that “[t]he answer to almost every question was that it
‘depends.’ Aggressiveness generally is inappropriate, unless the war was
initiated by the other side. Hardball usually is inappropriate, unless there is
a specter of mischievous plaintiffs’ lawyers waiting to use the information
from discovery for other suits.”113
In similar ways, ambiguity provides open space for other influences to
operate as lawyers construct arguments about what is and is not
appropriate.114 In one study, the lawyers interviewed indicated that they
“assumed that the ‘real’ meaning of ethical rules was consistent with
pragmatic concerns, even when the letter of the rules was not.”115 Other
lawyers talk about the need to “get comfortable” with what a client wants
them to do—a process by which they convince themselves that a course of
action is acceptable. This process of getting comfortable is made easier
when the rules are ambiguous.116
B.

The Agency Relationship

The fact that attorneys are charged with representing clients in agency
relationships can complicate ethical decision making in several important
ways. First, although an agent is expected to further the interests of the
principal, it is clear that attorneys have their own personal interests that may
or may not be directly compatible with those of their client. In addition,
clients may be willing to engage in conduct through their attorneys that they
would not engage in on their own. Similarly, lawyers who might not have
111. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 123, 126 n.14 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
2000); REGAN, supra note 13, at 328 (describing how conflicts of interest differ in litigation and
transactional work).
112. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 17, at 371; see also Mather & Levin, supra note 105.
113. Nelson, supra note 33, at 780 (emphasis added).
114. See Wendel, supra note 9, at 1171 (“[N]o matter how clear a rule appears to be, it will
always be ambiguous enough to be manipulated.”). See generally Feldman, supra note 30, at
885 (describing how technocratic lawyering interferes with ethical decision making).
115. Suchman, supra note 101, at 844 (emphasis added). See also Levin, supra note 17, at
369–71 (providing examples of small firm and individual practitioners who felt that there was a
“disconnect” between the ethical rules and the “realities of practice”).
116. Langevoort, supra note 66, at 22.
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been independently disposed to undertake or to propose a particular course
of unethical conduct may be more willing to do so when it is suggested by a
client.
1.

The Role of the Lawyer’s Interests

The interests of lawyer and client are often aligned and often favor
ethical behavior. Specifically, lawyers and clients will generally share an
interest in winning a case or negotiating a favorable deal. 117 Lawyers have
interests in seeing themselves as ethical legal professionals, in avoiding
discipline, and in maintaining a good reputation.118 Clients, too, may have
interests in behaving ethically.119
But, lawyers also routinely face situations in which their interests come
into conflict with clients’ interests and with their professional
responsibilities. Lawyers’ judgments can be influenced by a myriad of
desires—including the desire to satisfy the client, to make partner, to
generate fees, to manage their own cash flow, to win a case, to achieve or
maintain a particular reputation or status, to “do justice,” or to manage
limited time.120
These interests can influence the ways in which lawyers seek out and
interpret information and generate arguments.121 There is a tendency to
conflate what is fair or ethical with what serves one’s own interest,
especially as there are many metrics by which one can judge fairness.122
And, confirmation bias can lead us to interpret new information in ways
that favor our existing beliefs and to ignore dissent or other indications of

117. Note that there are ethical limits on attorneys being too closely aligned with their
client. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2010).
118. See, e.g., Joshua E. Perry et al., The Ethical Health Lawyer: An Empirical Assessment
of Moral Decision Making, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 461, 466 (2009).
119. We recognize that clients may also have interests in behaving unethically, at least in
the short run and as long as they don’t get caught.
120. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The
Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 412 (1997)
(discussing how attorney self-interest might affect advice about risk); Suchman, supra note 101
(describing the variety of interests that attorneys bring to ethical decision making). For a general
discussion of how legal actors manage multiple, sometimes conflicting, interests, see Jennifer
K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers
as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1153–54 (2003).
121. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480
(1990).
122. See Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value Will
be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 137, 147 (1975).
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ethical challenges.123 Thus, when an unethical course of action serves our
interests, it may be easy to latch on to the particular metric that validates
that course of action or to interpret the facts or the law in ways that are
consistent with a judgment that the desired course of action is appropriate.
“The ethical failure [then,] is not in the commitment to fairness but in the
biased interpretation of information.”124 But because we tend to believe that
we make decisions based on objective criteria—the illusion of objectivity—
it is difficult for us to recognize these effects.125
Such interests can affect how attorneys bill their time, the factual and
legal conclusions they draw, how they behave in negotiation, and the advice
they give their clients. Consider, for example, the lawyers advising Enron,
who “agreed to review the propriety of Enron transactions in which [the
lawyers’] own services had been used.”126 It would not be surprising if the
lawyers were motivated (consciously or unconsciously) to find that those
prior transactions had been appropriate.127 Consider, too, how an attorney
might feel the need to engage in puffing in order to land a particular client,
how an attorney might be influenced by the desire to obtain or keep a client,
or how an attorney’s desire for or fear of publicity might impact his
representation of a client.
Or think about how different billing arrangements might influence
lawyer decision making.128 A lawyer who is paid by the hour might be
inclined to spend more (conceivably unnecessary) time on a matter, be
“aggressive rather than conservative” in billing his time, and have a
123. Scott Sonenshein, The Role of Construction, Intuition, and Justification in Responding
to Ethical Issues at Work: The Sensemaking-Intuition Model, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1022,
1029–30 (2007). See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998); Barbara O’Brien, Prime
Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in
Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 315 (2009).
124. Chugh et al., supra note 51, at 83; see also David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis,
Fairness and Preference, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 418, 418 (1979).
125. Armor, supra note 48, at 11–12.
126. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1334 (2006).
127. If the lawyers were to find that their own prior advice was improper, they might not
only embarrass themselves but also expose themselves to possible legal liability. See Roger C.
Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS.
LAW. 143, 164–66 (2002).
128. See SUSAN SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE
242–46 (2002); A.B.A. COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT 2001–2002, at 5 (2002),
available
at
http://ilta.ebiz.uapps.net/productfiles/productfiles/914311/FMPG4_ABABillableHours2002.pdf;
Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 193–95
(1987). See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation:
What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1979–80 (2002).
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tendency to be slow in settling his clients’ disputes.129 In contrast, a lawyer
who is paid on a flat-fee or other fixed-rate basis might be inclined to
minimize the amount of time devoted to the matter.130 And, while a lawyer
working on a contingent fee may be motivated to spend time on the case in
order to increase the amount of the verdict, settlement, or deal on which her
fee will be based, she will only want to do so to the extent that such an
increase is greater than her investment.131 In addition, the contingent fee
attorney may be more likely to focus on the financial aspects of settlement
which will impact her fee, rather than non-financial aspects which could
benefit the client but not directly benefit the lawyer.
Finally, consider the case of the lawyer who represented the plaintiff in a
sexual harassment and discrimination suit.132 During a break in a deposition,
plaintiff found a set of privileged documents belonging to the other side on
a conference room table, read them, and removed them from the room.133
Upon learning of his client’s action and unsure about how to respond, the
lawyer began to interpret the facts in a favorable way (noting that the
documents “were right in front of her” and were not marked “confidential”),
to blame the other side (“they certainly knew how to handle documents”),
and to read selectively prior case law (relying on a case involving the
inadvertent delivery of privileged documents). He obtained a second
opinion, but from someone who also had an interest in the outcome of the
case. In all these ways, he convinced himself that the use of the documents
was allowable.134

129. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 320 (1999); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
509, 531–33 (1994) (distinguishing between interests of firm, which may desire to keep client
happy, and interests of individual attorney, who may have need to bill a large numbers of
hours).
130. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Practice, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 111, at 7.
131. See Sternlight, supra note 129, at 327–28.
132. ABEL, supra note 78, at 389.
133. Id.
134. The disciplinary authorities disagreed with the lawyer’s interpretation, ultimately
finding him in violation of ethics rules. Id.; Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1549, 1570 (2009) (reviewing ABEL, supra note 78).
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Conflicts and Disclosure

Conflicts of interest can arise not only between attorneys and their
clients, but also between the interests of multiple clients, or between current
and future or former clients.135 While many believe that adequate disclosure
of conflicts and consent thereto can help to address any potential
problems,136 and while the Model Rules seem to be based on this
assumption,137 recent research suggests that disclosure as a remedy is
potentially problematic.
Ideally, the disclosure of a conflicting interest permits the affected party
to discount the conflicted party’s advice or opinion to account for the
conflict.138 In practice, however, the affected party may not sufficiently
discount the advice.
First, although disclosure of a conflict of interest is likely to decrease
trust in the advisor’s recommendation,139 the discounting that results may
not be sufficient. Because we tend to underestimate the extent to which
situational pressures influence the behavior of others, the client may
underestimate the extent to which the conflict may have influenced the
attorney’s advice.140 Further, even were the client to attempt to discount the
conflicted advice, the client may have difficulty sufficiently adjusting away
from the anchor provided by the advice141 and may find it difficult to ignore
the advice once it has been proffered.142 Moreover, disclosure is also likely
135. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 289.
136. See generally Omri Ben Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 649–50 (2011) (surveying the frequency of disclosure as
remedy in a range of contexts). Note also that there are practical considerations involved in
disclosing conflicts and asking for a waiver. See SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 376–92.
137. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6–1.9 (2010) (allowing
representation in some instances following disclosure and informed consent).
138. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 18 (2010). A client deciding whether to retain a conflicted attorney
might similarly discount the likely impact of the conflict and overestimate their ability to
discount the advice given.
139. See, e.g., Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5–6 (2005); Sunita Sah et al., The Burden
of Disclosure: Increased Compliance with Distrusted Advice, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 289, 289 (2013).
140. This tendency is known as the fundamental attribution error. See Edward E. Jones &
Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 11 (1967).
141. Anchors provide a starting point for a judgment; adjustments are then made away from
the anchor, but these adjustments are often insufficient and result in judgments that are skewed
toward the starting point. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 3, 14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
142. Cain et al., supra note 139, at 6; see also Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of
Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1246–47
(1989); Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:
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to generate some countervailing degree of increased trust in the conflicted
advisor in some cases. In particular, to the extent that the disclosure signals
to the recipient that the attorney is attentive to potential conflicts and wants
to address them with integrity, disclosure may make the advisor seem
particularly forthright.143
Even when trust in the recommendation is degraded, there may be
increased pressure to act in accordance with the recommendation because
the client does not want to signal her distrust of the advisor (insinuation
anxiety).144 Wanting to be consistent in her own decision making,145 the
client may also resist second guessing her original decision to consult the
attorney and may compare the certain and immediate loss of the attorney’s
assistance with the less certain and future consequences stemming from the
conflict.146
Further, in addition to the failure of clients to sufficiently take account of
the potentially biasing effect of a conflict, attorneys’ disclosure of a conflict
might actually increase the influence of the conflict on attorney judgments
and actions. Research has found that behaving ethically at one point in time
can result in less ethical behavior at a later point in time by establishing the
moral credentials of the actor in her own mind and licensing her to behave
less ethically later.147 This is consistent with research finding that an
Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 437 (1997).
Legal fact-finders have similar difficulties in ignoring inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Mark
Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 301–03
(1996); Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
113, 124–25 (1994); William C. Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 453 (1981); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges
Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1251, 1253–58 (2005).
143. See Sah et al., supra note 139, at 290; see also Steven D. Pearson et al., A Trial of
Disclosing Physicians’ Financial Incentives to Patients, 166 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 623, 626
(2006); Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust,
23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393, 399 (1998) (explaining the development of relational trust).
144. Sah et al., supra note 139, at 290.
145. See CIALDINI, supra note 64, at 52 (describing the pressure for consistency).
146. See Leonard E. Gross, Are Differences Among the Attorney Conflict of Interest Rules
Consistent with the Principles of Behavioral Economics?, 19 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 111, 114
(2006); Cameron & Miller, supra note 86, at 91–101 (discussing loss aversion).
147. Dale T. Miller & Daniel A. Effron, Psychological License: When It Is Needed and
How It Functions, 43 ADVS. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (2010); Benoît Monin & Dale
T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 33, 34 (2001); see also Anna C. Merritt et al., The Strategic Pursuit of Moral
Credentials, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 774, 774 (2012). It is possible that acceptance
of routine disclosure as a remedy for conflicts might license the profession as a whole to believe
that they have effectively dealt with conflicts situations. See George Loewenstein et al., The
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individual who discloses a conflict may actually give more biased advice
than the attorney who does not disclose—a process known as disclosure
distortion.148
3.

Acting Unethically Indirectly—Through and On Behalf of
Others

Another complication that flows from the agency relationship between
attorney and client relates to the omission bias—the tendency to prefer
options that entail inaction to options that require action.149 Because harms
caused indirectly entail less moral intensity than harms inflicted directly,
people tend to be more willing to engage in unethical conduct when acting
through an agent than when acting for themselves.150 For example, in one
variant of the Milgram shock experiments in which the study participant
relied on another person to administer the shock151 over 90% of participants
administered the highest shock, as compared to “only” 63% of solo
participants who themselves had to shock a person in the next room and
30% of participants who had to directly place the other’s hand on a plate to

Unintended Consequences of Conflict of Interest Disclosures, 307 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 669, 669
(2012) (applying this literature to conflicts of interest in the medical profession).
148. Cain et al., supra note 139, at 13; Daylian Cain et al., When Sunlight Fails to
Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 37 J.
CONSUMER RES. 836, 841 (2011); see Daylian M. Cain et al., Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier:
The Shortcomings of Disclosure as a Solution to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY,
supra note 51, at 104; George Loewenstein et al., The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and
Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 423,
424 (2011); Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 190–91.
149. See generally Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475, 475 (1994); Mark Spranca et al.,
Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 76,
78–79 (1991).
150. Lucas C. Coffman, Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward), 3 AM. ECON.
J.: MICROECON. 77, 78 (2011); Neeru Paharia et al., Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The Moral
Psychology of Indirect Agency, 109 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
134, 134 (2009). Harms caused indirectly also tend to be punished less severely. Id. at 141; see
also Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility 2
(Univ. of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Working Paper No. 380,
2008), available at www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp380.pdf; Edward B. Royzman & Jonathan
Baron, The Preference for Indirect Harm, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 165, 182 (2002). See generally
Jason Dana et al., Ethical Immunity: How People Violate Their Own Moral Standards Without
Feeling They Are Doing So, in BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS: SHAPING AN EMERGING FIELD
201 (David De Cremer & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 2012).
151. See supra Section I.B.
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administer the shock.152 Clients, similarly, may be more willing to have their
attorneys act unethically on their behalf than they would be to themselves
engage in a particular unethical act. Indeed, some clients may hold a
schema153 or mental representation for “lawyer” that inclines them to make
such proposals.154
At the same time, because people tend to be more willing to endorse an
unfair proposal suggested by someone else than they would be to originate
such a suggestion themselves,155 lawyers may be more willing to approve a
client’s proposed unethical course of action than they would be to initiate
such a course. One recent study examined the extent to which attorneys
would disclose a material but damaging piece of information that had come
to their attention on the eve of reaching a favorable settlement agreement.
One of the primary justifications given by lawyers who chose not to
disclose was that their client did not want them to divulge the
information.156 While, legally, the fact that nondisclosure was requested by
the client does not justify the attorney’s action,157
the principal may feel more detached, and hence less responsible,
for such an action if it is delegated, while the agent may feel that
he or she was “just carrying out orders” . . . . Through the use of
agents, therefore, accountability for morally questionable behavior
can become vertically diffused, with no individual taking
responsibility.158

Finally, psychologists have found that people are more willing to engage
in unethical conduct when they believe such conduct will benefit another
152. MILGRAM, supra note 61, at 119–22.
153. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 76 (1991)
(defining “schema”).
154. Levin, supra note 17, at 339 (reporting the comments of one lawyer: “There’s an
expectation that people have that you are going to lie for them. That you’re going to make up
things for them. That that’s expected of them.”).
155. Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence:
Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10, 17 (2006) (describing
Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation:
Allocators Versus Recipients, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061, 1072 (1997)); Paharia
et al., supra note 150, at 141. This willingness to endorse another’s unethical suggestions is in
step with norms that “assign[] ultimate responsibility for the moral content of a client’s position
to the client himself,” rather than to the attorney as agent. Austin Sarat, Ethics in Litigation:
Rhetoric of Crisis, Realities of Practice, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 111, at 149.
156. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 11, at 125; see also Levin, supra note 17, at 338–40
(discussing lawyers requested to do things by “bad” clients).
157. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 11, at 123–25.
158. John R. Hamman et al., Self-Interest Through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for
the Principal-Agent Relationship, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1826, 1826 (2010).
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person.159 For example, questionable actions in discovery might be seen as
more appropriate when done to benefit a client one sees as being
“railroaded,” or a conflict of interest might be ignored to spare a client
added expense. Thus, lawyers may be more inclined to engage in unethical
acts they believe will benefit clients than they would be to engage in the
same behavior to benefit themselves alone.160
4.

Benefits of Agency Relationship

While we have seen that agency relationships can create ethical
difficulties for attorneys, attorney-client relationships can also serve as a
check on ethics. First, as we have noted, attorneys will not share all of their
clients’ interests—and attorneys have their own interests in avoiding
censure. This different perspective on clients’ decisions may allow the
attorney to see the ethical contours of a decision that have faded for the
client. Similarly, to the extent that an attorney has only periodic
involvement with a client, the attorney may be in a position to notice shifts
in practice that are not noticeable to a client who sees only the more
incremental changes. That is, the attorney may be better positioned to notice
the client’s slide down the slippery slope. In addition, harmful behavior is
less likely in the presence of a dissenter.161 Thus, developing a relationship
in which attorney and client are able to effectively express dissent can mean
that each can serve as an ethical check for the other. And, finally, to the
extent that searching analysis is part of our basic understanding of or
schema for attorneys, a client may be more receptive to the questioning of

159. See, e.g., Francecsa Gino & Lamar Pierce, Dishonesty in the Name of Equity, 20
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1153, 1159 (2009); Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Lying to Level the Playing
Field: Why People May Dishonestly Help or Hurt Others to Create Equity, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS
89, 101 (2010); Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based
Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help, 21 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 1176, 1189 (2010); Scott S.
Wiltermuth, Cheating More When the Spoils are Split, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 157, 166–67 (2011).
160. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice As Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 225, 243 (2006) (“The lawyers bought into an understanding of Enron as a valiant
corporate renegade, looking to manipulate the system in furtherance of the greater corporate
good.”); Michael Powell & Lois Romano, Roman Catholic Church Shifts Legal Strategy:
Aggressive Litigation Replaces Quiet Settlements, WASH. POST, May 13, 2002, at A1
(discussing attorneys for Catholic priests accused of sexual abuse “fighting to keep documents
secret and engaging in new tactics to minimize settlements,” so as to defend “good priests”).
161. See, e.g., MILGRAM, supra note 61, at 116; see also Solomon E. Asch, Studies of
Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL.
MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1, 2 (1956).
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her plans or activities that comes from her attorney than to similar critique
from another source.
C.

The Challenges of the Adversarial System

To advocate for a client’s interests implies some level of partisanship.
Both litigators and transactional attorneys often represent parties with
opposed positions and lawyers representing regulated entities can also come
to see regulators as their adversaries.162
Many ethical issues arise in this adversarial context. In the service of
“zealous advocacy,”163 attorneys may fail to ask their client important or
probing questions, fail to disclose material information to an opponent,
exaggerate claims, dissemble about alternative deals, coach rather than
prepare witnesses, aggressively cross-examine even candid witnesses, and
so on. Indeed, some lawyers view “an ability to push the ethical envelope
[as] a source of pride, rather than an embarrassing confession of
susceptibility to temptation.”164 In this view, “cautious punctiliousness [is]
at least as ethically troubling as venturesome zeal.”165 The structure of
attorneys’ relationships with their clients can sometimes mean that attorneys
are ethically obligated to behave in ways that would be viewed as unethical
in other contexts.166 But, the adversary system can also incline lawyers take

162. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 66, at 22 (“Where a loyalty to the corporate mission
comes to color the lawyers’ thinking, it becomes easy to start thinking of regulators and the
courts as rivals.”).
163. Although the Model Rules were revised in 2002 to make “zealous advoca[cy]” part of
the preamble, rather than part of the Rules, many attorneys continue to believe and act as if
“zealous advocacy” is required in all circumstances. The comment to Rule 1.3, requiring
“reasonable diligence,” makes clear however that “zeal” is limited by ethics and professional
discretion.
164. Suchman, supra note 101, at 854 (“Zealous advocacy was, to them, an affirmative
moral obligation, even when it came into conflict with other ethical rules.”); Wendel, supra note
9, at 1170 (recounting how long-time Enron attorneys defended their behavior as “creative and
aggressive” structuring of transactions for the benefit of their client).
165. Suchman, supra note 101, at 854.
166. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 710 (noting that “much of what is characterized as
aggressive or ‘hardball’ behavior is legitimate and functional in view of valid litigation
objectives and the conventional norms of the adversary game”); see also, e.g., People v. Belge,
376 N.Y.S.2d 771, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (holding that attorney-client privilege exempted
attorney from duty to report death occurring without medical attendance); Adam Liptak, When
Law Prevents Righting A Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, at WK4; Slayer’s 2 Lawyers Kept
Secret of 2 More Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1974, at 81.
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this zealousness too far and to “treat[] behavior that would be ethically
problematic in other contexts as not problematic.”167
Consider how an adversarial mindset might have influenced John
Gellene as he considered whether to disclose his ties to South Street and
Salovaara in the Bucyrus bankruptcy:
In the moral calculus that likely had emerged for Gellene
during [the bankruptcy] negotiations, [disclosure] would mean that
the party [(JNL)] that had behaved so unreasonably during the past
year would gain the upper hand. The debtor would have to hire
new counsel. That counsel would have to spend valuable time
becoming familiar with Bucyrus, the other parties, and the plan.
Furthermore, JNL undoubtedly would use this disruption as an
opportunity to push for drastic changes in the plan. . . . Given the
hostility of other parties to JNL, the result might be a bloody mess
that would leave Bucyrus beyond repair.
For these reasons, Gellene may have convinced himself
that non-disclosure not only was not morally blameworthy, but
that it was morally justified. . . . Disclosure would do little to add
to the integrity of the bankruptcy process, but could seriously
undermine the chance for a timely and successful
reorganization.168

Acting in a way that would provide an advantage to an opponent may
have been unthinkable.
Consider, too, that approaching a conflict or negotiation from a
competitive perspective tends to increase unethical behavior.169 Similarly,
we tend to evaluate behavior as being more ethical when we believe that we
are acting in response to unfair behavior by another.170 These findings are
consistent, for example, with many lawyers’ views of the discovery process:
167. Sarat, supra note 155, at 149; see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 156
(1930) (“Why should you expect the ethics of the game to be different from the game itself?”).
168. REGAN, supra note 13, at 347–48 (emphasis added).
169. Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on
Motivation and Behavior, 111 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 139, 139
(2010); Maurice E. Schweitzer et al., Conflict Frames and the Use of Deception: Are
Competitive Negotiators Less Ethical?, 35 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2123, 2140 (2005);
Wolfgang Steinel & Carsten K.W. De Dreu, Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in
Social Decision Making, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 419, 431 (2004); see also Gillian
Ku et al., Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision-Making: A Study of Auction Fever
in Live and Internet Auctions, 96 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 89,
101–02 (2005).
170. Maurice E. Schweitzer & Donald E. Gibson, Fairness, Feelings, and Ethical DecisionMaking: Consequences of Violating Community Standards of Fairness, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 287,
298 (2008).
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A question I have often asked lawyers is this: If the other
side does it, can you retaliate? The legal answer is no. The federal
rule against discovery abuse (Rule 26) does not have a “they
started it!” exception. But many lawyers think that if the other side
starts playing discovery games, they would be hurting their clients
to turn the other cheek.171

The tendency to assess the propriety of questionable negotiation tactics
more positively when they are described as responses to a questionable
tactic used by the other side172 can be particularly pernicious when
combined with our tendency to attribute bias or unfairness to those with
whom we simply disagree.173
Consider how all of this might influence a prosecutor’s application of
Brady v. Maryland.174 Brady requires the prosecution to disclose evidence
that is favorable to the defense when it “could reasonably be taken to put
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict.”175 In particular,
Brady requires a prosecutor who is determining whether to
disclose a piece of evidence to the defense to speculate first about
how the remaining evidence will come together against the
defendant at trial, and then about whether a reasonable probability
exists that the piece of evidence at issue would affect the result of
the trial. During the first step, a risk exists that prosecutors will
engage in biased recall, retrieving from memory only those facts
that tend to confirm the hypothesis of guilt. Moreover, because of
selective information processing, the prosecutor will accept at face
value the evidence she views as inculpatory, without subjecting it
to the scrutiny that a defense attorney would encourage jurors to
apply.
Cognitive bias would also appear to taint the second
speculative step of the Brady analysis, requiring the prosecutor to
171. David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY 60 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006).
Many litigated discovery disputes involve allegations by all parties about their opponents’ bad
behavior. See, e.g., 6 Michael B. Keating, BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
COURTS § 66:8 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2012); see also Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer
Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1630 (1996).
172. Stephen M. Garcia et al., Morally Questionable Tactics: Negotiations Between District
Attorneys and Public Defenders, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 731, 739 (2001).
173. Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of
Bias and the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833, 845 (2008).
174. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
175. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995); see also United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
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determine the value of the potentially exculpatory evidence in the
context of the entire record. Because of selective information
processing, the prosecutor will look for weaknesses in evidence
contradicting her existing belief in the defendant’s guilt. In short,
compared to a neutral decision maker, the prosecutor will
overestimate the strength of the government’s case against the
defendant and underestimate the potential exculpatory value of the
evidence whose disclosure is at issue. As a consequence, the
prosecutor will fail to see materiality where it might in fact
exist.176

D.

The Tolls of Law Practice

Long hours, deadlines, and workplace politics can combine to take a toll
on lawyers, as can lack of sleep, frequent interruptions, travel, difficult
decisions, and the struggle to balance work and family life. 177 In Eat What
You Kill, Regan describes John Gellene as working in an “environment of
constant urgency” in which getting five hours of sleep was thought to be a
“luxury.” Gellene did not sleep at all during the two days leading up to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition and the application for appointment as
Bucyrus’ counsel, two days that were described as being “‘a circus,’ with
people running around, papers flying, and a large group of lawyers, legal
assistants, and financial advisors turning the Bucyrus board room into
command central. The stress on everyone was palpable.”178
These sorts of job stresses impact ethical decision making. In a classic
study on time pressures, seminary students were assigned to give a three to
five minute impromptu talk in an adjacent building. Some students were
176. Burke, supra note 33, at 1611–12 (2006). It is also worth noting that there are
circumstances in which it is good rapport, rather than an adversarial relationship, that puts one
at risk of engaging in unethical behavior. In particular, one recent study demonstrated that
“negotiators seeking to build or maintain rapport may be more likely to deceive their partners
than to disappoint them with the truth.” Sandy D. Jap et al., The Dark Side of Rapport: Agent
Misbehavior Face-to-Face and Online, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1610, 1612 (2011).
177. See, e.g., Janine Robben, Burnout: Cautionary Tales, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 16, 22–24
(2008), available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/08oct/burnout.html; see also
Public Defender v. Florida, 115 So. 3d 261, 285 (Fla. 2013), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2013/sc09-1181.pdf (finding that excessive
workloads justified withdrawal by public defenders from an array of cases); JEAN WALLACE,
JUGGLING IT ALL: A STUDY OF LAWYERS’ WORK, HOME, AND FAMILY DEMANDS AND COPING
STRATEGIES, REPORT OF STAGE 2 FINDINGS 12–15 (2004); Stephanie Francis Ward, The
Ultimate Time-Money Trade-Off, 93 A.B.A. J. 24, 24–25 (2007); Mary Flood, New Lawyers
Say, ‘Pay Us Less, Don’t Work Us So Hard’, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 16, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/flood/4714709.html.
178. REGAN, supra note 13, at 134.
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told that they were late for their turn to talk; others were led to believe they
had more time. On the way to the other building each student encountered a
person in need of help—a person planted by the researchers: “the victim
was sitting slumped in a doorway, head down, eyes closed, not moving. As
the subject went by, the victim coughed twice and groaned, keeping his
head down.” Those participants who were in a hurry were significantly less
likely to stop to help than were those who were less rushed. 179 More recent
research has found that time pressure also results in a greater likelihood of
lying.180
Studies have also found that unethical decisions are more common when
the decision maker suffers from a lack of sleep or is otherwise cognitively
taxed.181 And, the process of making decisions, being deprived of food, and
even resisting the desire to snack can also result in cognitive depletion. 182
When a decision maker’s cognitive resources have already been challenged,
the decision maker is more likely to put himself in temptation’s way and
then succumb to that temptation.183 Depleted individuals are also less likely

179. John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 100, 104 (1973). Interestingly, participants who were assigned to speak about the
parable of the “Good Samaritan”—a story about helping someone in need—were no more likely
to stop to help than those assigned to speak about another topic. Id.
180. Shalvi et al., Honesty Requires Time, supra note 79, at 1265.
181. See, e.g., Christopher M. Barnes et al., Lack of Sleep and Unethical Conduct, 115
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 169, 178 (2011); Michael S. Christian
& Aleksander P.J. Ellis, Examining the Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Workplace Deviance: A
Self-Regulatory Perspective, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 913, 926 (2011); Francesca Gino et al., Unable
to Resist Temptation: How Self-Control Depletion Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 191, 199 (2011); Nicole L. Mead et al.,
Too Tired to Tell the Truth: Self-Control Resource Depletion and Dishonesty, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 594, 596 (2009); Mark Muraven et al., Self-Control Depletion
and the General Theory of Crime, 22 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 263, 273 (2006); see also
William D.S. Kilgore et al., The Effects of 53 Hours of Sleep Deprivation on Moral Judgment,
30 SLEEP 345, 350 (2007).
182. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1252, 1263 (1998); Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in
Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889, 6890 (2011) (finding more generous
parole board decisions when board members were well fed); Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Making
Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making,
Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 883, 897 (2008).
President Barack Obama has eliminated all suits that are neither gray nor blue, so that he need
not expend cognitive energy making clothing choices. Obama says: “I’m trying to pare down
decisions. I don’t want to make decisions about what I’m eating or wearing. Because I have too
many other decisions to make.” Michael Lewis, Obama’s Way, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2012, at 216,
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/10/michael-lewis-profile-barack-obama.
183. Mead et al., supra note 181, at 596.
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to recognize the moral dimensions of decisions184 and experience less
guilt.185 Making matters worse, decision makers do not anticipate these
effects on decision making.186
At the same time, these unfortunate forces can be countered. There is
evidence that decision makers who recognize the need for self-control, and
who are motivated to exercise that control, may be able to temper the
depleting effects of cognitive strain.187 Other research has found that those
who believe that their willpower is a non-limited resource are less likely to
show decreased performance following a demanding task.188
Finally, some of the most common sorts of ethical failures—such as poor
client communication, the neglect of client matters, overbilling, or abuse of
client trust funds—can stem in part from the economic pressures of law
practice.189 For example, a lawyer or firm may feel economic pressure to
accept cases that would be better declined. A lawyer may succumb to the
planning fallacy, overconfidently believing that he can competently handle
another case, and then find himself overwhelmed.190 A lawyer may decide
to engage in advertising that she otherwise finds disagreeable in order to
generate scarce business.191 Or, a lawyer who is surviving hand-to-mouth
may begin her slide down the slippery slope when she is tempted to
“borrow” from client accounts or to co-mingle funds—just a little bit, for
just a little while—in order to deal with perceived temporary cash flow
184. Gino et al., supra note 181, at 199.
185. Hanyi Xu et al., Too Fatigued to Care: Ego Depletion, Guilt, and Prosocial Behavior,
48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1183, 1185 (2012).
186. Mead et al., supra note 181, at 596.
187. See Michael Inzlicht & Brandon J. Schmeichel, What Is Ego Depletion? Toward a
Mechanistic Revision of the Resource Model of Self-Control, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 450,
459 (2012) (reviewing studies); Mark Muraven & Elisaveta Slessareva, Mechanisms of SelfControl Failure: Motivation and Limited Resources, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
894, 905 (2003) (finding that motivation moderates depletion effects).
188. Joshua J. Clarkson et al., When Perception is More Than Reality: The Effects of
Perceived Versus Actual Resource Depletion on Self-Regulatory Behavior, 98 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 45 (2010); Veronika Job et al., Ego Depletion—Is It All in Your Head?:
Implicit Theories About Willpower Affect Self-Regulation, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1686, 1692 (2010).
189. For a discussion of the changing economics of legal practice, see Gordon, supra note
27, at 717–18; Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1913 (2008). As part of this
transformation, the relationship between in-house and outside counsel has changed as well. See
Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 543–44 (1985).
190. Buehler et al., supra note 49, at 2.
191. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers and the Tension
between Professional Norms and the Need to Generate Business, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE:
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 118 (highlighting one lawyer’s
belief that a failure to use the same tactics as others forfeits business to those that do).
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problems.192 Even attorneys at the largest and most prestigious firms feel
serious financial pressure to try to maintain or build their reputation as
being highly profitable.193
E.

Status and Power

In addition to being a demanding profession, lawyering also tends to be a
relatively high status profession and lawyers may frequently perceive
themselves to be more powerful than others, such as clients.194 Attorneys
may also draw power in particular situations (such as a negotiation) from
their possession of private information or an attractive alternative.195 Thus,
while attorneys will not always be more powerful than others with whom
they interact and will vary in the degree to which they occupy positions of
status or power, they may regularly find themselves functioning from a
position of perceived status, power, or strength.
All this matters for attorney ethics because social status tends to be
negatively associated with ethics, with those in higher status positions
tending to engage in more unethical behavior.196 There is even evidence that
simply conceiving of the self as a professional—which entails a belief in
one’s technical and ethical competence—is associated with unethical
behavior.197 In addition, people who feel powerful can be more likely to

192. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 17, at 359.
193. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm
for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 31 (2000).
194. See, e.g., Keiko Nakao & Judith Treas, Updating Occupational Prestige and
Socioeconomic Scores: How the New Measures Measure Up, 24 SOC. METHODOLOGY 1, 48
(1994); Gillian Stevens & David L. Featherman, A Revised Socioeconomic Index of
Occupational Status, 10 SOC. SCI. RES. 364, 383 (1981); Robert M. Hauser & John Robert
Warren, Socioeconomic Indexes for Occupations: A Review, Update, and Critique app. A at 5,
(Ctr. Demography & Ecology, Working Paper No. 96-01, 1996). A recent Harris Poll reported
that 81% of respondents felt lawyers have “some” to “very great prestige.” Firefighters,
Scientists and Doctors Seen as Most Prestigious Occupations, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Aug. 4,
2009),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-PresOccupations-2009-08.pdf.
195. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Power Asymmetries and the Ethical
Atmosphere in Negotiations, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS
209 (John M. Darley et al. eds., 2001).
196. Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior, 109
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4086, 4088 (2012); see also Bella L. Galperin et al., Status
Differentiation and the Protean Self: A Social-Cognitive Model of Unethical Behavior in
Organizations, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 407, 416 (2011).
197. Maryam Kouchaki, Professionalism and Moral Behavior: Does a Professional SelfConception Make One More Unethical? 37 (Edmond J. Safra Res. Lab Working Papers, Paper
No. 4, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243811.
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engage in unethical behaviors such as cheating.198 Power tends to make
people more attuned to the attraction of rewards, feel more entitled, be more
goal directed, be more overconfident, and be less concerned about social
censure than are those who feel more powerless.199
In addition, more powerful people tend to be less likely to take the
perspective or feel the emotions of another person. In particular, powerful
people are less likely to take into account another person’s visual
perspective, less likely to adjust for the fact that others lack access to their
private information, and are less accurate at identifying emotions in
others.200 Predictably, less empathy or understanding of the emotions of
another is associated with more unethical behavior.201 And, for lawyers,
such difficulties in reading others may result in a failure to attend to the
needs of clients and lead to ethical violations such as a failure to
communicate.
While feeling powerful can increase unethical behavior, powerful people
may be more protected than are others against at least one set of pressures.
To the extent that powerful people are less concerned about social censure
or other situational pressures, they may be better able to resist conforming
to unethical social norms.202 In addition, power tends to increase the focus
198. Joris Lammers et al., Power Increases Hypocrisy: Moralizing in Reasoning,
Immorality in Behavior, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 737, 742 (2010); see also Terry L. Boles et al.,
Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining, 83 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 235, 237 (2000); Helmut Crott et al., The Effects of Information
Exchange and Communication in an Asymmetrical Negotiation Situation, 10 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 149, 160 (1980). Ironically, powerful people tend to judge others more harshly for
unethical conduct. Lammers et al., supra.
199. See, e.g., Nathaneal J. Fast et al., Power and Overconfident Decision-Making, 117
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 249, 257 (2012); Ana Guinote, Power
and Goal Pursuit, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1076, 1084 (2007); Dacher Keltner
et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 265, 279 (2003); Lammers et al.,
supra note 198, at 738; Deepak Malhotra & Francesca Gino, The Pursuit of Power Corrupts:
How Investing in Outside Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships, 56 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
559, 563 (2011). People in more powerful roles may also be “buffered” from feeling the effects
of unethical behavior. See, e.g., Dana R. Carney et al., How Power Corrupts: Power Buffers the
Emotional, Cognitive, and Physiological Stress of Lying 20 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Haas Sch.
of
Bus.
Research
Grant,
2011–2016,
2011),
http://mors.haas.berkeley.edu/papers/Carney.HowPowerCorrupts.pdf.
200. Adam D. Galinsky et al., Power and Perspectives Not Taken, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1068,
1072 (2006).
201. See Taya R. Cohen, Moral Emotions and Unethical Bargaining: The Differential
Effects of Empathy and Perspective Taking in Deterring Deceitful Negotiation, 94 J. BUS.
ETHICS 569, 576 (2010).
202. See Adam D. Galinsky et al., Power Reduces the Press of the Situation: Implications
for Creativity, Conformity, and Dissonance, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1450, 1462
(2008). It also seems to be the case that power asymmetries can result in unethical behavior by
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on salient goals. To the extent that these focal goals are strongly linked to
ethical or cooperative behavior, more ethical conduct may be expected.203
F.

Lawyers as Social Actors

No dilemma causes [students] more anxiety than the
prospect of being pressured by their boss to do something
unethical. Not only do they worry about losing their jobs if they
defy the boss to do the right thing, they also fear that the pressures
of the situation might undermine their ability to know what the
right thing is.204

These students are right to be worried.
First, recall the Milgram studies in which people followed the
instructions of an authoritative experimenter to administer increasingly
severe shocks to another person.205 These studies make evident “that each of
us ought to believe three things about ourselves: that we disapprove of
destructive obedience, that we think we would never engage in it, and more
likely than not, that we are wrong to think we would never engage in it.”206
In the context of legal practice, the influence of authority can come in the
form of a more senior lawyer, a colleague, or a client.207
either the more powerful or the weaker party. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 195, at
210.
203. See Jacob B. Hirsh, Adam D. Galinsky, & Chen-Bo Zhong, Drunk, Powerful, and in
the Dark: How General Processes of Disinhibition Produce Both Prosocial and Antisocial
Behavior, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 415, 418 (2011); see also Stéphane Côté et al., Social
Power Facilitates the Effect of Prosocial Orientation on Empathic Accuracy, 101 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 217, 217 (2011). For discussion of the ways in which different
dimensions of social class may influence ethical behavior in different ways, see Stefan T.
Trautmann et al., Social Class and (Un)Ethical Behavior: A Framework, With Evidence From a
Large Population Sample, 8 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 487 (2013).
204. David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 111, at 94–95.
205. See MILGRAM, supra note 61.
206. Luban, supra note 204, at 97 (emphasis omitted); see also Perlman, supra note 33;
Kim, supra note 9; KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 65. For examples from other professions,
see Annamarie Krackow & Thomas Blass, When Nurses Obey or Defy Inappropriate Physician
Orders: Attributional Differences, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 585, 585 (1995); Eugen
Tarnow, Self-Destructive Obedience in the Airplane Cockpit and the Concept of Obedience
Optimization, in OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE MILGRAM
PARADIGM 111 (Thomas Blass ed., 2000).
207. See, e.g., Eldred, supra note 25, at 354–55 (describing pressure from superiors on
public defenders to handle more cases); Perlman, supra note 33, at 451 (describing associate
told not to produce documents within scope of discovery request). Young lawyers or lawyers
who lack mobility may be particularly susceptible in this regard. Psychological research has
found that those who are more dependent upon an organization are more likely to engage in
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While the rules of professional responsibility do not allow a lawyer who
acts “at the direction of another person” to escape responsibility for ethical
misconduct, the rules do provide that a “subordinate lawyer does not violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a
supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of
professional duty.”208 Given all that we know about ethical blindspots, it
would not be surprising if subordinate lawyers had difficulty making
objective judgments about whether a question is “arguable” and about the
“reasonableness” of the superior’s resolution. And, as we have discussed,
lawyers are skilled at making arguments on multiple sides of an issue.209
Thus, when a partner tells an associate to do something the associate
initially finds ethically questionable, the associate may well be able to craft
an argument to convince himself that the particular behavior is acceptable.
Even in the absence of directions from an authority, ethical behavior can
be influenced by other people. We learn how to comport ourselves, in part,
by watching the actions of those around us, looking to see how others—
particularly those with more experience or expertise—behave.210 “[L]awyers
are social beings; like other human beings in social and occupational
groups, lawyers behave largely in accordance with group norms.”211 For
attorneys this might be other lawyers within a firm or agency, lawyers who
share space, or other formal or informal advice networks—their
“communities of practice.”212 The more widespread an attorney believes a
compliant unethical behaviors. See, e.g., Judy Wahn, Organizational Dependence and the
Likelihood of Complying with Organizational Pressures to Behave Unethically, 12 J. BUS.
ETHICS 245, 248 (1993).
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2010).
209. See supra text accompanying note 103.
210. See, e.g., ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 27 (Erik Gilg ed., 11th ed. 2012);
Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies, 10
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 220 (1968); see also MUZAFER SHERIF, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 84–85 (1936); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT:
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 221 (2007) (describing the Stanford Prison
Experiment); Asch, supra note 161, at 70; Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates
of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
245, 251 (2005) (examining the effects of conformity and independence on brain activity);
Michael J. O’Fallon & Kenneth D. Butterfield, The Influence of Unethical Peer Behavior on
Observers’ Unethical Behavior: A Social Cognitive Perspective, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 117, 126
(2012).
211. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for
Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 27 (2000).
212. LYNN M. MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF
PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 41 (2001) (describing communities of practice and their effects);
Lynn Mather, How and Why Do Lawyers Misbehave? Lawyers, Discipline, and Collegial
Control, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE
109, 116 (Scott L. Cummings ed., 2011) (reviewing empirical literature on different
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particular practice is, the more likely he is to indicate that he would engage
in it213 and the more tempting the unethical behavior, the more widespread
he will believe it to be.214
When [lawyers] begin work at law firms, they watch the more
experienced lawyers to see what the real standards of conduct are.
Each firm quickly communicates its institutional norms to new
associates; many associates are anxious to assimilate themselves
into an institution and to be successful within it. Therefore, they
are not critical of the norms they are asked to adopt. They redraw
their lines to fit into the value systems of their firms. If the senior
lawyers are not precise in their billing practices, the junior lawyers
will not be. If the senior lawyers exaggerate their credentials or
expertise when talking with new clients, the junior lawyers will do
the same.215

We are particularly influenced by others who we consider to be members
of our group. Studies have found that observing an in-group peer acting
unethically increases the likelihood that the observer will similarly act
unethically.216 When someone with whom one shares similarities (even the
same name or birthday, let alone the same profession or firm) acts
unethically, we judge their behavior as less unethical and feel greater
distance from our own moral compass.217 The Milgram studies also show

communities of practice); see also Elizabeth Chambliss, Whose Ethics? The Benchmark
Problem in Legal Ethics Research, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 47, 48 (describing the “ethical learning” that takes place as
“lawyers gradually acquire specialized ethical expertise”); Leslie C. Levin, Specialty Bars as a
Site of Professionalism: The Immigration Bar Example, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 194, 196–97
(2011) (describing communication of professional norms within specialty bars). The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct point lawyers to “the approbation of professional peers” as a
source of ethical guidance. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE (2010).
213. See, e.g., Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 11, at 150.
214. Tenbrunsel, supra note 54, at 336.
215. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 681 (1990); see JEROME E.
CARLIN, LAWYERS ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 116–17 (1966); see also
Kirkland, supra note 33, at 691; Levin, supra note 17, at 322; Nelson, supra note 189, at 527;
Suchman, supra note 101, at 860–61.
216. Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The
Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 397 (2009). In contrast,
“observing an out-group peer engaging in unethical behavior reduced participants’ likelihood of
acting unethically themselves.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Francesca Gino et al., Contagion
or Restitution? When Bad Apples Can Motivate Good Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1299, 1301 (2009) (finding that seeing a member of one’s in-group act unethically
can trigger compensatory ethical behavior when an out-group member is present).
217. Francesca Gino & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Dishonesty: When Psychological
Closeness Creates Distance From One’s Moral Compass, 119 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
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the importance of social norms—when participants worked together with a
(confederate) peer who administered the shocks, compliance reached over
90%. But when peers refused to comply, compliance dropped to 10%.218
When a lawyer is discomfited by what he sees, he may struggle to make
sense of and justify that conduct. For example, David Luban describes an
associate who observed a senior litigator lie to an opponent about a
discovery matter and then watched the senior litigator compound that
mistake by lying to a federal judge in an attempt to cover up the initial lie.
The associate did not take any steps to correct the record and labored to
make sense of what he was seeing—he “couldn’t believe it . . . [and] kept
thinking there must be a reason.”219
Consider also the possibility of pluralistic ignorance—mistakenly
believing that others do not share one’s understanding or perception of the
world.220 When one looks around the firm (or to other observers such as
accountants or regulators) and does not see anyone else objecting to
questionable behavior, one may conclude that nothing is amiss, judging
others’ failure to object as evidence that the behavior is not improper. But
those others may be silent because they too are attempting to assess the
situation.221
To make matters worse, the illusion of transparency—the tendency to
overestimate our ability to accurately read others’ emotional states and their
ability to read ours—can compound the difficulties that people have in
assessing each other’s reactions.222 In one set of studies, for example,
observers’ ratings of the extent to which people appeared outwardly
concerned about another person’s unethical behavior were significantly
lower than those same people’s self-rated levels of actual concern. That is,
people were more concerned than they looked. But people also
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 15, 24 (2012). The study also found a similar, but smaller, effect
with respect to vicarious honesty. Id. at 23.
218. MILGRAM, supra note 61, at 119.
219. Luban, supra note 204, at 95 (emphasis added).
220. Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. Prentice, Collective Errors and Errors About the
Collective, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 541, 541 (1994); Deborah A. Prentice &
Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and the Perpetuation of Social Norms by Unwitting
Actors, in 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 161 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1996).
221. In a classic study, psychologists Bibb Latané and John Darley investigated what would
happen when smoke started to drift into a room in which research participants were filling out
questionnaires. When participants were alone, most (75%) reported the smoke. But, when more
participants were in the room, far fewer reported the smoke. Latané & Darley, supra note 210,
at 217–18. Looking to others for social cues often provides useful information—but not always.
222. See Thomas Gilovich et al., The Illusion of Transparency: Biased Assessments of
Others’ Ability to Read One’s Emotional States, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 332, 344
(1998).
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overestimated the degree to which they manifested their concern to others.
Thus, individuals may believe that their own concern is apparent to others
when it is not.223
Finally, the presence of others can sometimes result in a diffusion of
responsibility in which no one assumes responsibility for acting.
A well-known example involves the failure of top
Salomon Brothers officials to report or take prompt corrective
action against a trader who submitted false auction bids to evade
Treasury Department purchase limits. Four top executives knew of
the misconduct and failed to act for several months: the CEO, the
president, the general counsel, and the vice chairman, who was the
trader’s supervisor. According to findings by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, each of these officials “placed
responsibility for investigating [and curbing the trader’s] conduct .
. . on someone else.” The result was a major financial crisis when
the threat of a public investigation ultimately forced disclosure.224

Similar diffusion of responsibility can occur, for example, when an
associate assumes that someone else will make a decision about how to bill
her hours.225
G.

Responding to Others’ Ethicality

Lawyers often find themselves in the position of dealing with the
ethicality of others—clients, colleagues, and opponents.226 Interestingly, we
tend to be much more judgmental of the ethical failings of others than we
are of our own, to see ourselves as being more ethical, objective, and fair
than others,227 to doubt others’ reasons for engaging in cooperative acts, and
to assume that other people are motivated by self-interest.228 We often have
223. Id. at 343 (studies 3a and 3b).
224. Deborah L. Rhode, Introduction: Where is the Leadership in Moral Leadership?, in
MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY 1, 27–28
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006).
225. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 215, at 716 (describing firm in which associates and
paralegals were to keep complete billing records and partners would reduce if they thought the
work was excessive).
226. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010) (“A lawyer who knows that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,
shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”).
227. See Gilovich et al, supra note 222.
228. Epley & Caruso, supra note 52, at 172; see also Clayton R. Critcher & David
Dunning, No Good Deed Goes Unquestioned: Cynical Reconstruals Maintain Belief in the
Power of Self-Interest, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1207, 1212 (2011); Epley &
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an interpersonal ethics blind spot in which others’ unethical behaviors are
more noticeable than their ethical ones.229 Consistent with the actorobserver bias, we attribute others’ moral failings to flaws in their
dispositions, but attribute our own missteps to situational factors.230 We
focus more on ethics when judging others, but find competence more
important than integrity when judging ourselves.231 And we judge others
based on faulty predictions about what we might have done under the same
circumstances.232
But while we can be relatively harsh judges of others’ ethics, our
psychology can make it difficult to notice and respond to others’ unethical
behavior.233 First, limits on our ability to pay attention can lead us to miss
unethical behavior taking place right in front of us when we are focused on
other things like our own cases and deadlines.234 Second, we have a
tendency to identify with other people—colleagues or clients—whose
interests are aligned with ours,235 making it harder to notice and objectively
Dunning, supra note 48, at 873; Tal Eyal et al., Judging Near and Distant Virtue and Vice, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1204, 1209 (2008); Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The
Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 53, 60 (1998).
229. Moberg, supra note 55, at 416.
230. Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent
Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR
80 (Edward E. Jones et al. eds., 1972).
231. See, e.g., Bogdan Wojciszke, Morality and Competence in Person- and SelfPerception, 16 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 155, 181 (2005).
232. See DAVID A. DUNNING, SELF-INSIGHT: ROADBLOCKS AND DETOURS ON THE PATH TO
KNOWING THYSELF 131 (2005); Mark D. Alicke, Egocentric Standards of Conduct Evaluation,
14 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 171, 189 (1993); Balcetis & Dunning, supra note 53, at
112; Kristina A. Diekmann, “She Did What? There Is No Way I Would Do That!” The Potential
Interpersonal Harm Caused by Mispredicting One’s Behavior, 80 J. BUS. ETHICS 5, 5 (2008);
Woodzicka & LaFrance, supra note 53, at 17; see also Rachel Barkan et al., The Pot Calling the
Kettle Black: Distancing Response to Ethical Dissonance, 141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GEN. 757, 768 (2012) (finding process of “double distancing” in that acting unethically causes
us to judge others more harshly and to present the self as more virtuous).
233. Francesca Gino et al., See No Evil: When We Overlook Other People’s Unethical
Behavior, in SOCIAL DECISION MAKING: SOCIAL DILEMMAS, SOCIAL VALUES, & ETHICAL
JUDGMENTS 241, 241–42 (Roderick M. Kramer et al. eds., 2010).
234. See Christopher F. Chabris et al., You Do Not Talk About Fight Club If You Do Not
Notice Fight Club: Inattentional Blindness for a Simulated Real-World Assault, 2 I-PERCEPTION
150, 150 (2011); Graham Davies & Sarah Hine, Change Blindness and Eyewitness Testimony,
141 J. PSYCHOL. 423, 431–33 (2007); Kally J. Nelson et al., Change Blindness Can Cause
Mistaken Eyewitness Identification, 16 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 62, 62 (2011);
Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional
Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059, 1059 (1999).
235. Don A. Moore et al., Conflict of Interest and the Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT &
DECISION MAKING 37, 45 (2010); Leigh Thompson, “They Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship
and Involvement, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 839, 850 (1995); see also Leigh
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assess their ethics. Similarly, it can be difficult to acknowledge the
unethical behavior of others when doing so would harm one’s own interests.
This motivated blindness can cause our judgments to be biased in favor of
our client or colleague and we are inclined to view their actions favorably,
disinclined to believe that they have acted wrongly, and able to recruit
reasons to support their actions.236 Third, we may let others off the hook
because we are aware of other instances in which they have acted
ethically—a form of moral licensing.237 Fourth, just as it can be difficult to
identify the point at which one’s own behavior has gradually crossed the
line, detection of when others’ incrementally degrading behavior becomes
unethical can be challenging.238 Fifth, the fact that outcome bias may cause
our evaluations of the quality of a decision to be influenced by how the
decision turns out,239 can lead us to ignore others’ unethical decisions unless
and until something bad happens.240
Finally, people tend to think that they “will take socially risky actions,
when they, in fact, do not”—the illusion of courage.241 In the abstract we
might think we would have the courage to call out the unethical behavior of
a client or colleague,242 but when actually deciding whether to do so the
immediate negative consequences of confronting the other person—a
difficult conversation, the loss of a client, the ire of a partner, the loss of a
job, or the difficulty of procuring future employment—loom large. Consider
also another key lesson from the Milgram obedience studies—that although
Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal
Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 194 (1992).
236. Moore et al., supra note 235, at 40; see Langevoort, supra note 33, at 104; see also
Kimberly Kirkland, Self-Deception and the Pursuit of Ethical Practice: Challenges Faced by
Large Law Firm General Counsel, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 593, 593–94 (2011) (describing the
difficulty that large firm general counsel have in characterizing colleagues as unethical).
237. See Daniel A. Effron & Benoît Monin, Letting People Off the Hook: When Do Good
Deeds Excuse Transgressions?, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1618, 1631 (2010)
(finding this to be the case when the unethical act is somewhat ambiguous and the prior ethical
behavior is in the same domain).
238. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 37, at 48 (discussing how auditors might gradually
come to accept corporation’s unethical accounting practices).
239. Baron & Hershey, supra note 83, at 578.
240. Gino et al., supra note 84, at 93; see also, e.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based
Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 23 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 404
(2003) (noting that a supervisor may rate an employee’s bad conduct negatively upon learning
of a poor outcome, but is less likely to do so if the outcome is unknown).
241. DUNNING, supra note 232, at 148.
242. Here, too, there is a blind spot: we tend to believe that we are more likely to call out
bad behavior than are our peers (and that our reporting is more internally driven, while that of
our peers is more driven by external rewards). Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives
Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for
Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1190 (2010).
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most of the participants noticed that what they were being asked to do was
problematic, and indeed, many clearly expressed reservations,243 they were
nonetheless unable to turn their objections into a course of behavior that
effectively resisted the direction to continue. As psychologists Lee Ross and
Richard Nisbett have noted: “the Milgram experiments ultimately may have
less to say about ‘destructive obedience’ than about ineffectual, and
indecisive, disobedience.”244 For example, there were lawyers who raised
questions about Enron’s dealings before its collapse. “In the end, [however,]
the doubting lawyers never pressed the issues.”245
In this vein, consider again the story of John Gellene and his false
declarations about potential conflicts of interest in affidavits submitted to
the court. At several points in the course of the representation, one of
Gellene’s partners, Toni Lichstein, raised questions about the potential
conflict of interest. Lichstein, however, was repeatedly told by Gellene and
Lederman that “it was not a problem . . . [and] that Milbank had undertaken
all of its disclosure obligations.”246 Although Lichstein questioned the
conduct on several occasions, she was not able push the issue hard enough
to convince the firm to take action.
When faced with others’ potentially unethical conduct, attorneys may
make decisions with an eye toward minimizing the regret that they
anticipate feeling—worrying more about making a false accusation than
about failing to intervene.247 Attorneys may overweight such anticipated
losses as compared to the less certain and more abstract future
consequences of remaining silent. Yet, the future consequences may turn
out to be severe.248

243. MILGRAM, supra note 61, at 116.
244. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 153, at 57 (emphasis added).
245. Gordon, supra note 21, at 1193 (citing Mike France, What About the Lawyers?, BUS.
WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58; Ellen Joan Pollock, Limited Partners: Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its
Deals, Didn’t Force Issue, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at A1).
246. REGAN, supra note 13, at 250.
247. Mark D. Rogerson et al., Nonrational Processes in Ethical Decision Making, 66 AM.
PSYCHOL. 614, 616 (2011). This is also another example of the omission bias. See Baron &
Hershey, supra note 83, at 569.
248. For example, some of those who heard about or witnessed Penn State coach Jerry
Sandusky’s transgressions, but failed to report them, are themselves now being prosecuted.
Mark Scolforo, Graham Spanier Charged: Ex-Penn State President Facing Perjury Charge in
Jerry
Sandusky
Case,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Nov.
1,
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/01/graham-spanier-charged-penn-statesandusky_n_2057723.html.
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WHY DON’T WE RECOGNIZE AND LEARN FROM ETHICAL FAILURES?

For many of the same reasons that we find it difficult to identify ethical
challenges in the moment, we also find it difficult to see the ethical
implications of our decisions after the fact. Indeed, in one study of lawyer
discipline cases, most of the lawyers “were convinced that they had done
nothing wrong.”249 And, in many notorious cases—such as the collapse of
Enron—the lawyers involved maintain that they acted properly.250 Once we
have engaged in unethical behavior, we feel the need to reconcile that
behavior with our otherwise positive views of ourselves, to avoid the
distressing feeling known as cognitive dissonance.251 Thus, we may engage
in a post-hoc process of moral disengagement in which we re-characterize
what happened so that questionable conduct becomes more permissible.252
While many people think of ethical decision making as being the product of
deliberative ethical reasoning, psychologists have found that ethical
decision making tends to be based on relatively intuitive judgments, with
moral reasoning occurring after the fact.253 Once we have made a choice, we
are usually able to mobilize reasons to bolster that decision.254
249. ABEL, supra note 78, at 491.
250. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 1190; see also The Financial Collapse of Enron—Part
4: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Oversight and Investigations, 107th Cong. 19–22 (2002)
(statement of Joseph C. Dilg, Managing Partner of Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg78506/html/CHRG-107hhrg78506.htm
(expressing his confidence that the firm “fully met its ethical and professional responsibilities”
in representing Enron).
251. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 8 (1957); see also Shahar
Ayal & Francesca Gino, Honest Rationales for Dishonest Behavior, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY: EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF GOOD AND EVIL 149, 150 (Mario
Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2012) (describing ethical dissonance); Luban, supra note
204, at 95.
252. Bandura, supra note 67, at 194; Lisa L. Shu et al., Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience:
When Cheating Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting, 37 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 331 (2011).
253. Haidt, supra note 104, at 818. For a general discussion of intuitive and deliberative
thinking, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
254. See, e.g., Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors
Influence Judgments, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 122, 123
(1996); Michael I. Norton, Joseph A. Vandello, & John M. Darley, Casuistry and Social
Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 817 (2004); Samuel R. Sommers &
Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race Neutral Justifications: Experimental
Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
261, 264 (2007); see also Richard Nisbett & Timothy Wilson, Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 232 (1977). The analytic
skills of lawyers seem well suited to this sort of thinking. Indeed, people engaging in this sort of
rationalization are sometimes characterized as “intuitive lawyers.” See, e.g., Haidt, supra note
104, at 821; Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of
Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers as Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CONDUCT:
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Given this general human tendency, it is unsurprising that lawyers who
face ethical complaints or questions tend to recruit a range of
justifications.255 Conduct that is inconsistent with one’s image of oneself as
an ethical person can be attributed to situational, rather than dispositional,
factors.256 Attempts may also be made to locate blame elsewhere—on
adversaries,257 on the circumstances,258 on regulators,259 on clients,260 and on
judges.261 The omission bias described above can be invoked to minimize
blame of one who did not engage in an affirmative act.262 Unethical conduct
can also be rationalized post-hoc through appeals to different metrics of
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 59 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel
eds., 1996).
255. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 78, at 100.
256. See Jones & Harris, supra note 140; see also Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 828 (1998) (reporting that each group of attorneys “presents itself as
a ‘victim’ of forces over which it has little or no control”).
257. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 256, at 822 (reporting attorney’s view that “[r]efusal to
answer (a discovery request) is not an ethical problem because plaintiffs’ counsel can remedy it
(through motions to compel)”); see also Yablon, supra note 171, at 1624 n.18 (“Lawyers tend to
blame discovery abuse on the fact that their opponents act like jerks . . . .”); Michael Powell &
Lois Romano, Roman Catholic Church Shifts Legal Strategy: Aggressive Litigation Replaces
Quiet Settlements, WASH. POST, May 13, 2002, at Al (reporting that lawyers for the church “said
some plaintiffs are delusional, while others blame every problem in their life on past abuse by
priests”).
258. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 78, at 33, 65, 100 (noting that lawyers blame circumstances
such as workload, judicial backlog); Lerman, supra note 215, at 713–14 (describing lawyers
who justified unethical billing practices by pointing to the “unreasonable” billing requirements
of their firms).
259. Langevoort, supra note 66; see also ABEL, supra note 78, at 32 (noting disciplined
lawyers’ objections to “selective prosecution”); REGAN, supra note 13, at 328 (“Lawyers in
large firms . . . tend to be skeptical that strict application of the bankruptcy conflict rule serves
important ethical purposes.”).
260. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 78, at 65 (describing a lawyer who “blamed his personal
injury clients for his own failure to pursue their claims”), at 101 (describing lawyer who
deceived client because “it would have been very hard for him to understand” and failed to tell
another her case had been dismissed (due to his negligence) because “she never asked me
specifically”). Billing disputes are often blamed on clients, with attorneys arguing that clients
received regular billing statements and should have raised any questions at earlier stages, that
big clients can afford to pay more, that aggressively billing big clients allows them to represent
other clients who cannot afford them, and that they only billed what they were worth. See, e.g.,
ABEL, supra note 78, at 350–51; Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and
Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 258–62 (1999); cf. Lisa G. Lerman,
Scenes From A Law Firm, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2153, 2187–88 (1998).
261. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 256, at 832 (reporting lawyers’ consensus “that judges hate
to get involved in discovery disputes . . . leaving it to the lawyers to play the discovery game
with relatively little supervision”).
262. For example, an attorney might tell herself or others that she would have disclosed
particular information if the other side had specifically asked about it.
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fairness or to other accepted values—for example, notions of lawyers as
zealous advocates or creative interpreters of legal rules, rules protecting
client confidences, principles of reciprocity or self-defense, or the need to
fight against injustice.
Confirmation bias also helps us remember aspects of the decision or
situation that are consistent with an ethical self-image, rather than the
details of any ethical lapse. “If mistakes were made, memory helps us
remember that they were made by someone else. If we were there, we were
just innocent bystanders.”263 Such memory effects can result in what ethicist
Patricia Werhane has called moral amnesia or “an inability to remember or
learn from one’s own and other’s past mistakes and to transfer that
knowledge when fresh challenges arise.”264
All of this can conspire with the pressure to act in ways that are
consistent with our own prior behavior,265 making it difficult to learn from
or acknowledge any missteps. Consider again John Gellene, the bankruptcy
attorney described in Eat What You Kill. Why didn’t he, at some point,
recognize his mistake and correct his misstatements to the court?
It likely would have been psychologically stressful for Gellene to
do so at this point, however. He had made a prior decision not to
disclose the Salovaara and South Street connections. He had
publicly proclaimed Milbank’s fitness for the job in the face of an
attack. He likely had rationalized his conduct in a way that
permitted him to deny that he had done anything unethical. It
would be hard at this point to disavow those representations and to
reassess that rationalization.266

263. CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY
WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 70 (2007).
264. PATRICIA H. WERHANE, MORAL IMAGINATION AND THE SEARCH FOR ETHICAL
DECISION-MAKING IN MANAGEMENT 7 (1999). As a result of this sort of self-deception, people
can fail to discount their accomplishments for the fact that such successes were gained through
unethical means. This can make learning particularly difficult. See Zoë Chance et al., Temporal
View of the Costs and Benefits of Self-Deception, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15655, 15656
(2011) (finding that participants who obtained high scores by cheating predicted that they would
score well on a subsequent test on which they could not cheat).
265. CIALDINI, supra note 64, at 57.
266. REGAN, supra note 13, at 343; see also Langevoort, supra note 66, at 512 (“To blow
the whistle now on any common practice or pattern of innovation would raise troubling
questions about the prior months or years when the lawyer acquiesced in what was happening.
The mind fights such inference.”).
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Finally, engaging in unethical behavior can itself change one’s
perspective on and memory of the relevant ethical standards.267 When our
behavior and our beliefs conflict, one way to reduce the resulting
discomfort is to change our beliefs to match our behavior. For example,
those who cheat tend to become more lenient in their judgments of cheating,
and those who resist cheating become more intolerant of cheating. 268 Also,
the effects of pluralistic ignorance can mean that as no one speaks up about
particular unethical behavior, new norms of ethics begin to emerge that alter
attitudes about ethics.
IV.

WHAT CAN WE DO?

The common prescriptions for ethical failures are to increase the severity
and enforcement of applicable sanctions and to pay greater attention to
educating attorneys about the relevant ethical rules.269 But while some
ethical failures are the result of deliberate moral reasoning and cost-benefit
analysis that lead to an unethical decision and some ethical failures are due
to a lack of knowledge of the relevant rules, a range of evidence suggests
that many ethical failures occur unconsciously and unintentionally, even
where the attorney has basic knowledge of the relevant ethical rules. Thus,
individual attorneys and legal employers270 should take steps that go beyond
these common responses, steps that focus on dealing with ambiguities in
rules and standards,271 ethical issues arising out of the agency relationship,
the challenges of the adversarial system, the tolls of law practice, the
influence of status and power, issues relating to lawyers’ practice in groups,

267. Shu et al., supra note 252, at 332; Lisa Shu & Francesca Gino, Sweeping Dishonesty
Under the Rug: How Unethical Actions Lead to Forgetting of Moral Rules, 102 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1164, 1168 (2012).
268. See, e.g., Judson Mills, Changes in Moral Attitudes Following Temptation, 26 J.
PERSONALITY 517, 518 (1958). See generally Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive
Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 203–04 (1959).
Even considering the behavior from the perspective of the person who has acted unethically can
affect judgments of ethicality. Shirit Kronzon & John Darley, Is This Tactic Ethical? Biased
Judgments of Ethics in Negotiation, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 58 (1999).
269. See, e.g., Monroe Freedman, Foreward, Ethics, Truth, and Justice in Criminal
Litigation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1371, 1375 (2000).
270. The psychology of ethical decision making and behavior that we review here also has
important implications for how we teach about ethics in law schools. For one recent discussion
on this subject see Art Hinshaw, Teaching Negotiation Ethics, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 82 (2013).
271. We do not, in this Article, offer suggestions as to how ethical rules might be changed
to better accommodate human psychology. While improvement in the content of the rules is
likely possible and desirable, our focus here is on improvements that can be made in the context
of the existing ethical rules.
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and the difficulties lawyers face in responding to instances in which others
fail to act ethically.
A.

Improving Individual Ethics

For all the reasons discussed, even attorneys who begin their careers with
the purest of motives and the highest of ethical aspirations are at risk for
committing ethical infractions. Yet, attorneys can take affirmative steps to
minimize the likelihood that they will behave unethically and to create the
capacity for ethical courage.272
1.

Be Aware of the Psychology of Ethics

It is important for lawyers to recognize their susceptibility to bounded
ethicality and to have an awareness of the factors that can influence ethical
decision making. While many of the phenomena we discuss operate outside
of conscious awareness, recognizing their existence makes it possible to
take steps to address them.273 Attorneys can better plan for how to handle
ethical dilemmas if they understand that their predictions about how they
will react to future ethical issues are not always accurate. Attorneys who
understand that unethical decisions are more likely when losses loom can
exercise particular caution in those circumstances—such as when they are at
risk of losing an important client. Attorneys who understand the nature of
the slippery ethics slope can seek to resist the pull of each step. Attorneys
who understand that even (or especially) their core values can lead them
astray, can be alert for such vulnerability. Attorneys who understand the
dynamics of social norms and pluralistic ignorance will be equipped to

272. See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COURAGE: MODERN RESEARCH ON AN ANCIENT
VIRTUE (Cynthia L.S. Pury & Shane J. Lopez, eds., 2010); see also ZIMBARDO, supra note 210,
at 21–22, 485 (discussing the “banality of heroism” and noting that just as each of us is capable
of unethical behavior, so too are we each a “potential hero, waiting for the right situational
moment to make the decision to . . . [do the right thing] despite personal risk and sacrifice”);
Psychology & Heroism: Defining Heroism, HEROIC IMAGINATION PROJECT,
http://www.heroicimagination.org/welcome/psychology-and-heroism (last visited Sept. 8,
2013).
273. See NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—
BUT SOME DON’T 366 (2012) (quoting Daniel Kahneman: “‘There’s no way that you can control
yourself not to have [the Müller-Lyer] illusion,’ Kahneman told me. ‘You look at [the arrows],
and one of the arrows is going to look longer than the other. But you can train yourself to
recognize that this is a pattern that causes an illusion, and in that situation, I can’t trust my
impressions; I’ve got to use a ruler.’”).
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reject the assumption that no one else is bothered.274 Attorneys who
recognize the temptation of post-hoc rationalization can question the
reasons they generate for their own behavior.275 Attorneys who know that
disclosure distortion may lead them to act more unethically in a situation in
which interests conflict can take steps to guard against that result. And,
attorneys who are aware that the agency relationship may tempt them to
overstep can watch how far they go to try to help their client.276
2.

Make Ethics Salient

“[I]f we are reminded of morality at the moment we are tempted, then we
are much more likely to be honest.”277 Thus, it can be important for
attorneys to find ways to include ethical factors in the mix of considerations
reviewed in making a given decision,278 even when the decision does not
obviously turn on ethical considerations.
Bringing ethical considerations to the forefront can also help us
encourage others to behave ethically. For example, negotiators are less
likely to engage in deception when they have recently been reminded of
ethical norms.279 Similarly, negotiators who give reasons for their offers or
demands that are in step with fairness norms are more likely to elicit ethical
behavior from the other side.280
To bring ethics to the fore, individual attorneys can:
274. For example, the Enron whistleblower, Sherron Watkins, spoke out even though others
at Enron acted as if all were well. Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1379–81 (2003).
275. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67, at 234.
276. See generally Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring
Behavior: The Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 565 (2007) (finding that educating people about the limits of introspection
reduced the bias blind spot).
277. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 289 (2008); see also Mazar et al., supra note 36, at 635 (hypothesizing that “when
people attend to their own moral standards . . . any dishonest action is more likely to be
reflected in their self-concept . . . which in turn will cause them to adhere to a stricter
delineation of honest and dishonest behavior”).
278. Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 20 (suggesting that organizations can reduce
unethical behavior by “making behavioral norms . . . more prominent and clearly defined”); see
also David F. Caldwell & Dennis Moberg, An Exploratory Investigation of the Effect of Ethical
Culture in Activating Moral Imagination, 73 J. BUS. ETHICS 193, 201 (2007).
279. See, e.g., Karl Aquino, The Effects of Ethical Climate and the Availability of
Alternatives on the Use of Deception During Negotiation, 9 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 195, 200
(1998).
280. See Maurice E. Schweitzer & Donald E. Gibson, Fairness, Feelings, and Ethical
Decision-Making: Consequences of Violating Community Standards of Fairness, 77 J. BUS.
ETHICS 287, 287 (2008).
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Reflect regularly on core values. Keeping a journal or engaging in
other forms of self-reflection can help keep ethics on the table and
can facilitate detection of moments in which decisions challenge
those values.281
Keep a reminder of core values front and center. A paperweight,
wall hanging, or other memento can be a visual reminder of the
standards one wants to uphold.282
Avoid euphemisms.283
Imagine and individualize the people on the other side or the people
who will experience the consequences of a decision.284
Bear in mind the long-term reputational consequences—to the
individual lawyer and the organization—of unethical conduct.285
3.

Be Self-Critical

It can be helpful for individual lawyers to develop a critical stance
toward their own ethics. Given how easy it can be for attorneys to justify a
desired course of action or fall into telling clients, colleagues, or supervising
attorneys what they want to hear, attorneys should ask themselves whether
their advice or ethical decisions would be the same if they were on the other
side of the decision. Questioning one’s judgments, considering the

281. See, e.g., Crowley & Gottlieb, supra note 102, at 68 (recommending self-reflection
activities to help practitioners consider the origin of their personal morals and how they align
with the ethics code). Law professor Kate Kruse, who has her students write letters to
themselves discussing their core values and ambitions and then returns the letters (unopened) to
students when they graduate, reports that students have found the letter helps keep them on their
intended path. Professor Jennifer Brown has commenced a journaling project with her students,
designed to help them think about their internal values and recall their early goals and values
once they become attorneys. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Beginner’s Wisdom: A Guided Journal
for Reflecting Upon the Professional and Personal Lessons of the 1L Year (unpublished work in
progress) (on file with author); see also Alison L. Antes et al., Applying Cases to Solve Ethical
Problems: The Significance of Positive and Process-Oriented Reflection, 22 ETHICS & BEHAV.
113, 115, 123 (2012); Hugo J.E.M. Alberts et al., Fighting Self-Control Failure: Overcoming
Ego Depletion by Increasing Self-Awareness, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 58, 58
(2011) (finding that self-awareness increases self-control).
282. See ARIELY, supra note 277.
283. See supra notes 77–78.
284. See supra notes 83–85; see also Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 20 (suggesting
that organizations can reduce unethical behavior by teaching employees to “learn to associate
potential unethical behavior with severe, well-defined harm . . . to a familiar or recognizable
victim similar to the actor”).
285. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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opposite,286 and examining “the justifications that we concoct to rationalize
our actions” with a critical eye can help to temper the fading of ethics from
decision making.287
Similarly, seeking or adopting an outside perspective—ideally before
one takes the first step, but also when one finds oneself elsewhere on the
slope—can lead to a more nuanced consideration of a decision’s potential
ethical implications.288 Consulting past experience can help one more
realistically assess whether a contemplated workload is manageable or
whether another case can be competently handled.289 Considering how a
“disinterested” or “disagreeable” observer might evaluate the situation,
decision, or conduct, can provide a valuable perspective.290 Consulting
ethics counsel291 or calling an ethics hotline292 may contribute to this critical
analysis. Attorneys may also find it helpful to consider how a trusted friend
or family member might view a particular action—asking themselves, for
example, whether they could look a parent in the eyes and explain a
particular choice.293 Similarly, one might be careful not to do anything one
would not feel comfortable having made public.294
286. Charles G. Lord, et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social
Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1231 (1984); see also Laura J. Kray &
Adam D. Galinsky, The Debiasing Effect of Counterfactual Mind-sets: Increasing the Search
for Disconfirmatory Information in Group Decisions, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 69, 76 (2003).
287. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67, at 234.
288. Rhode, supra note 126, at 1320–21; Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67, at 231
(recognizing also that the best one may be able to do is to “try to imagine what the other would
experience from our own perspective”).
289. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A
Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 24–25 (1993) (discussing the “outside
view” as one that takes into account past cases that are similar to the present one).
290. See Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 296 (2006) (discussing the “disagreeable
adjudicator”); Lord et al., supra note 286, at 1231–32 (finding that considering an “opposite”
perspective is effective in reducing biased evaluation). Prior to 2002, the commentary to Rule
1.7 advised that lawyers consider the perspective of a “disinterested lawyer” in evaluating
conflicts of interest, but that language was removed as part of the Ethics 2000 revisions to the
rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (2001).
291. See Kimberly Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms at Work
in Large US Law Firms: The Role of Ethics Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 181, 199 (2008)
(evaluating the role of ethics counsel).
292. See, e.g., Ethics Hotline, ST. B. OF CAL., http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Ethics/Hotline.aspx
(last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
293. In describing decisions to act ethically, many people evoke the notion that they want to
be able to “look at themselves in the mirror.” This idea has been attributed to a German
ambassador who purportedly resigned rather than provide prostitutes to a royal party, stating “I
refused to see a pimp in the mirror in the morning when I shave.” HOWARD GARDNER ET AL.,
GOOD WORK: WHEN EXCELLENCE AND ETHICS MEET 11 (2001). Consistent with this instinct,
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As part of this critical stance, a focus on attentively striving to behave
ethically is key. Valuing ethics as part of one’s identity helps to sustain
ethical behavior when time and cognitive resources are in short supply. That
is, one who puts great stock in having a positive moral identity is better
equipped to resist the pull towards unethical conduct.295 Attorneys might
prime the importance of ethics to their identity by attending conferences or
participating in other groups focused on professional responsibility296 as
well as through the other ways in which they choose to make ethics salient.
At the same time, it is also very important to be humble about one’s
likely success in this endeavor. Given the tendency to be overconfident
about our own ethics,297 attorneys should resist the “reassuring illusion of
invulnerability”—the misapprehension that they will always be able to
identify and resist the influences that shape behavior.298 In particular, all
else being equal, people who are primed to think of themselves as highly
ethical are more likely to act unethically (as a result of moral licensing) than
are those who focus on their own past unethical deeds.299 It is better, then, to
admit and remember mistakes, rather than to overestimate one’s virtue.300
Overall then, striving for ethical success but recognizing one’s ethical
fallibility may be the best path toward ethical behavior.
increasing awareness of one’s self and values—for example, looking at one’s image in a
mirror—reduces the incidence of unprincipled behavior. See, e.g., Arthur L. Beaman et al., SelfAwareness and Transgression in Children: Two Field Studies, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1835, 1842 (1979); Edward Diener & Mark Wallbom, Effects of Self-Awareness on
Antinormative Behavior, 10 J. RES. PERSONALITY 107, 107 (1976); Carl A. Kallgren et al., A
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: When Norms Do and Do Not Affect Behavior, 26
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1002, 1008–10 (2000); Lynne C. Vincent et al.,
Stretching the Moral Gray Zone: Positive Affect, Moral Disengagement, and Dishonesty, 24
PSYCHOL. SCI. 595, 598 (2013).
294. See Leslie C. Levin, Immigration Lawyers and the Lying Client, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 101–03.
295. Francesca Gino et al., Unable to Resist Temptation: How Self-Control Depletion
Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC. 191, 199
(2011); Barry R. Schlenker et al., Moral Identity, Integrity, and Personal Responsibility, in
PERSONALITY, IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note
31., at 316; see also Gert Cornelissen et al., Rules or Consequences? The Role of Ethical MindSets in Moral Dynamics, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 482, 487 (2013).
296. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 13 (2009) (suggesting that people often identify with groups and adopt a set of
standards that guide behavior).
297. See supra Section I.A.
298. ZIMBARDO, supra note 210, at 180.
299. Jennifer Jordan et al., Striving for the Moral Self: The Effects of Recalling Past Moral
Actions on Future Moral Behavior, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 701, 702 (2011);
see also ZIMBARDO, supra note 210; Sonya Sachdeva et al., Sinning Saints and Saintly Sinners:
The Paradox of Moral Self-Regulation, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 523, 524 (2009).
300. Jordan et al., supra note 299.
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Plan Ahead

Critical thought takes time and cognitive resources, and as previously
discussed, a lack of time and the presence of cognitive stressors can lead to
unethical decision making. But attorneys can enhance their ethical behavior
by planning ahead and cultivating a set of ethical habits, so that making the
right call becomes more automatic.301
Because it can be quite difficult to predict how we will handle ethical
challenges, we should try to anticipate ethical dilemmas and to specifically
plan and rehearse our responses ahead of time—creating scripts for
ourselves that we can follow when necessary.302 Engaging in an ethical
planning process allows us to step away from the relevant pressures and
focus instead on how to rise to one’s ethical ideals.303 Similarly, exploring
one’s “ethics autobiography”—reflecting on personal values, professional
responsibilities, and how they relate, can help establish ethical intuitions
and increase awareness of one’s ethical weaknesses.304 Identifying the
resources that might be available—for example, in-house ethics counsel, an
ethics hotline, or a trusted confidant—can mean that these resources will
more likely spring to mind when needed. Anticipating the pressures that are
likely to be dominant at the time of the decision can minimize misprediction.305 And, establishing implementation intentions—anticipating
concrete triggers and planning specific responses—can help one to act
consistently with one’s ideals.306 Imagining and practicing, for example, the
301. See Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the
Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 197 (2004). In particular, some of
the effects we have described here—such as the impact of loss frames on ethical decision
making—can be moderated when there is less time pressure. Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh,
Bounded Ethicality: The Perils of Loss Framing, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 378, 378 (2009). Because
busy attorneys will not always have time for extended analysis, it is important to take time to
make thoughtful decisions when that is possible and to plan ahead for when it is not.
302. Ann E. Tenbrunsel et al., The Ethical Mirage: A Temporal Explanation as to Why We
Aren’t as Ethical as We Think We Are 37 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 08-012, 2009);
see also Trope & Liberman, supra note 59, at 404.
303. Kivetz & Tyler, supra note 59, at 208.
304. Crowley & Gottlieb, supra note 102, at 68 (“[I]ncreased insight may enable
practitioners to recognize how good intentions can be assets and liabilities and help them detect
the direction of this influence in complex ethical situations.”).
305. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 154 (2011) (citing Kristina A. Diekmann et al., An
Examination of the Relationship Between Behavioral Forecasts and Interpersonal
Condemnation in Two Organizational Conflict Situations (Univ. of Utah, Working Paper,
2010)).
306. See Peter M. Gollwitzer & Paschal Sheeran, Implementation Intentions and Goal
Achievement: A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Processes, 38 ADV. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
69, 69 (2006).
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specifics of how one will respond when a negotiation counterpart or
discovery request asks for information one would rather not disclose, how
one will respond when one is asked to do something with which one is
uncomfortable, how one will deal with pressures to bill inappropriately,
how one will proceed when one suspects that a client has not been candid or
when a client asks the attorney to lie, or how one will act when one
observes a colleague behaving unethically, can make it much easier to
follow through with those plans.307
To reduce the possibility of unwittingly sliding into problematic
behavior, it can be helpful to identify concrete behaviors that can serve as
warnings that a line may be crossed.
Set yourself some telltale sign—something that you know is
wrong. Write down on a piece of paper: “I will never backdate a
document.” Or “I will never let a co-worker get blamed for
something that was my fault.” Or “I will never paper a deal that I
don’t understand.” Or “I will never do anything that I couldn’t
describe to my dad while looking him in the eye.” Pick your
telltale sign carefully—and, the moment the alarm rings, evacuate
the building.308

One immigration lawyer “recalled that his mentor in his first job taught
him ‘that the minute that fraud comes up, you show people the door.’” 309
Similarly, it can be helpful to identify warning signs of less egregious
missteps.
Because we feel inclined to act in ways that are consistent with our
previous actions, making a commitment to an ethical course of conduct—
particularly an active or public commitment—can help us stay the course.
307. See G. Richard Shell, Bargaining with the Devil Without Losing Your Soul, in WHAT’S
FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 57, 71–73 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds.,
2004) (discussing ways to respond to questions without lying). In similar ways, crafting a
strategy in advance for how one might disobey authority might channel disobedience. Lee Ross
and Richard Nisbett propose the following “thought experiment”:
Suppose that the experimenter had announced at the beginning of the session
that, if at any time the teacher wished to terminate his participation in the
experiment, he could indicate his desire to do so by pressing a button on the
table in front of him. We trust the reader agrees with us that if this channel
factor had been opened up, the obedience rate would have been a fraction of
what it was. The converse of this is that the absence of such a ‘disobedience
channel’ is precisely what condemned Milgram’s subjects to their hapless
behavior.
ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 153, at 57.
308. Luban, supra note 171, at 369.
309. Levin, supra note 294, at 102.
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Thus, one might “precommit to [an] intended ethical choice by sharing it
with an unbiased individual whose opinion you respect and whom you
believe to be highly ethical”310 or one might write down a set of ethical
commitments.311
Finally, planning ahead can sometimes help one to eliminate potential
problems—such as conflicts of interest. For example, one might avoid a
certain type of fee agreement in a particular case. Or, one can decline to
provide counsel when one’s judgment might be compromised. “No ethically
sensitive (or even reasonably prudent) attorney should follow the example
of Vinson & Elkins, which agreed to review the propriety of Enron
transactions in which its own services had been used.”312 Similarly, if one
believes an organization does not operate ethically, one may choose not to
work there.313
5.

Recognize and Confront Others’ Unethical Conduct

Many of these same strategies can help attorneys notice and respond to
potential ethical missteps by clients, colleagues, or supervisors. But, we
have seen that it can be quite difficult to recognize others’ unethical conduct
and that group settings often make it even harder to recognize unethical
conduct, due to the pressures of phenomena such as social conformity,
pluralistic ignorance, and the illusion of transparency.314 To fight against
these phenomena, attorneys should make ethics salient, exercise critical
thought, and remind themselves that others’ silence is not necessarily an
endorsement of particular behavior.
Of course, even once attorneys have recognized questionable ethical
actions involving clients, colleagues, or supervisors, it can also be
particularly difficult to critique or challenge that behavior. Instead, it is
tempting to withhold criticism from clients, colleagues, and supervisors,
particularly in a workplace where collegiality is valued. But, attorneys
should remind themselves that taking a critical stance better serves the
client or colleague than does letting them blithely slide down a slippery
ethical slope. Moreover, raising ethical concerns need not result in nasty
confrontations. Instead, it is possible that the “[c]onduct that attorneys find
310. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 305, at 156. Thus, one might plan, with
colleagues, law school classmates, or others, how one will respond to specific ethical
challenges.
311. See Crowley & Gottlieb, supra note 102, at 68 (discussing the benefits of journaling).
312. Rhode, supra note 126, at 1334.
313. See MATHER ET AL., supra note 212, at 124–27.
314. See supra Section II.F.
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ethically objectionable can be more diplomatically packaged as unduly
risky, as something that will not play well with jurors, government
regulators, the media, or the general public. By the same token, the moral
high road can also be portrayed as desirable for prudential reasons,”
important to the reputation of the client, lawyer, organization or profession,
or as a means of forestalling regulation.315 Admittedly, such
characterizations are not always possible or sufficient, and in some
instances attorneys will have to be more blunt—serving the client,
organization, or colleague by providing a reality check. In extreme
circumstances, the attorney may even be required to withdraw from a
representation or report a client or colleague’s improper act.316 Again,
planning ahead can facilitate doing the right thing in these difficult
circumstances.
B.

Enhance Organizational Ethical Culture

Legal organizations cannot assume that law schools have taught junior
attorneys everything they need to know about legal ethics, nor about
reporting any problems they may find.317 “To assume that any 20-year-old
of good general character can function ethically in professional situations is
no more warranted than assuming that any logical 20-year-old can function
as a lawyer without special education.”318 Similarly, legal organizations
cannot assume that more senior lawyers know all that is necessary to
prevent unethical behavior. Indeed, their very seniority and experience can
contribute to the fading of ethics. Thus, organizations need to help all
lawyers engage with ethics on an on-going basis.
The ethical culture of a firm, company, agency, or practice group is an
important determinant of how ethically the attorneys within that entity will
behave.319 Importantly, the ethical culture of an organization depends not
315. Rhode, supra note 126, at 1318–19.
316. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010).
317. For example, Harvard grads “almost uniformly felt that their ethics training in law
school had done little to prepare them for the issues they now confront as practicing attorneys.”
Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to be a Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young
Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV.
495, 508 (2003).
318. LINDA K. TREVIÑO & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS: STRAIGHT
TALK ABOUT HOW TO DO IT RIGHT 15–16 (2007) (quoting James Rest, Moral Judgment: An
Interesting Variable for Higher Education Research, paper presented at the Annual Convention
for the Association for the Study of Higher Education (1987)).
319. See, e.g., Caldwell & Moberg, supra note 278, at 199–202; Muel Kaptein, Developing
and Testing a Measure for the Ethical Culture of Organizations: The Corporate Ethical Virtues
Model, 29 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 923, 923 (2008) (discussing characteristics of ethical
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only on its expressed ethical codes and policies but also far more broadly on
its systems and practices.320 Just as group norms may have a negative
impact, so too may group norms set the stage for attorneys to do the right
thing.321 Lawyers who observe others within the organization engaging in
ethical behavior (particularly those seen as experts322 and those with whom
they work closely)323 and who observe that the organization rewards ethical
climate: clarity of expectations, congruent signals, sufficient time/resources/systems,
transparency, discussability, sanctionability); Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 21; James C.
Wimbush & Jon M. Shepard, Toward An Understanding of Ethical Climate: Its Relationship to
Ethical Behavior and Supervisory Influence, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 637, 638 (1994) (defining ethical
climate as a set of “stable, psychologically meaningful, shared perceptions employees hold
concerning ethical procedures and policies existing in their organizations”); see also Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 942 (2007)
(stating that culture “helps establish what is considered legitimate or unacceptable in an
organization”). See generally MATHER ET AL., supra note 212; EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE
COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A
CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP 255 (2001).
320. In fact, research on the effects of codes of conduct alone has yielded mixed results. A
recent meta-analysis concluded that the “existence of a code of conduct had a trivial connection
with unethical choice.” Gary S. Weaver & Linda K. Treviño, Compliance and Values Oriented
Ethics Programs: Influence on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315, 316–
18 (1999) (finding, however, a “strong negative link . . . between code enforcement and
unethical choice”). Other research has found that having a code of conduct or other set of ethical
strictures at the forefront of one’s mind when making a decision can lead to more ethical
decision making. See, e.g., Mazar et al., supra note 36, at 635 (suggesting that dishonesty
increases as attention to standards for honesty decreases); see also Robert C. Ford & Woodrow
D. Richardson, Ethical Decision Making: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 13 J. BUS.
ETHICS 205, 216 (1994) (reviewing studies); Terry W. Loe et al., A Review of Empirical Studies
Assessing Ethical Decision Making in Business, 25 J. BUS. ETHICS 185, 194 (2000) (reviewing
studies); O’Fallon & Butterfield, supra note 210, at 117–31 (reviewing studies). For exploration
of the meaning of organizational culture generally, see Susan S. Silbey, Legal Culture and
Cultures of Legality, in SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE: A HANDBOOK 470 (John R. Hall et al. eds.,
2010).
321. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 17, at 316 (finding attorney ethics to be influenced more
by communities of practice than by the rules); Linda K. Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and
Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 131 (1999) (“A
firm’s approach to ethics and legal compliance management has an enormous impact on
employees’ attitudes and behaviors.”). For a discussion of the influence of norms found in
communities of practice, see Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements,
Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 809–13 (2000).
322. See generally CARL I. HOVLAND ET AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE (1953); Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, The
Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 635, 647
(1952).
323. Gary R. Weaver et al., “Somebody I Look Up To:” Ethical Role Models in
Organizations, 34 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 313, 316–17 (2005); see also David M. Mayer
et al., How Low Does Ethical Leadership Flow? Test of a Trickle-Down Model, 108
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 8 (2009) (finding that ethical
leadership at higher levels influences employee behavior through its effect on mid-level
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behavior are likely to make more ethical decisions themselves. Consider
how two different prosecutors describe the culture within their offices and
the messages those cultures send about ethics. The first culture emphasizes
winning:
“The trial atmosphere is that you’re there to win and have
to win. That was really pushed, not a spoken rule but there was
that pressure. You got it from the supervisor, his boss and those
around you. It’s celebrated when you win.” In other words,
regardless of what the chief prosecutor says to the public or within
the office about the importance of procedural fairness, prosecutors
get the message that winning at trial is the key to career success
and that fair-process values are comparatively unimportant.324

In contrast, consider how another prosecutor describes the tone set by the
district attorney in his office:
As prosecutors we’re not just out to win but to see that justice is
done. We follow the principle that full disclosure is better in order
to protect the process and the people subject to the process. Our
office provides full disclosure and by adhering to the idea that we
want to see justice done we protect the process and avoid wrongful
convictions.325

Different ethical climates can push behavior in different directions. But,
while it is important to promote ethical behavior, it is also important to
promote ethical behavior for the right reasons. It turns out that instrumental
ethical climates grounded in not getting caught, self-interest, or individual
advancement tend to be associated with a greater likelihood of unethical
behavior as compared to ethical climates based on benevolence or concern
for clients, colleagues, or social justice.326 Thus, whereas a culture of “eat
what you kill” might be a fertile breeding ground for unethical behavior,
climates based on principles or rules and standards tend to be associated
with more ethical behavior.327

supervisors). See generally Melissa S. Anderson et al., What Do Mentoring and Training in the
Responsible Conduct of Research Have To Do with Scientists’ Misbehavior? Findings From a
National Survey of NIH-Funded Scientists, 82 ACAD. MED. 853 (2007).
324. Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences on
Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT,
supra note 101, at 286–87.
325. Id. at 282.
326. Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 12–13.
327. Id. at 3, 6; see also Weaver & Treviño, supra note 320 (comparing values-based and
compliance-based ethics programs). See generally Bart Victor & John V. Cullen, The
Organizational Bases of Ethical Work Climates, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 101 (1988).
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Discuss and Model Ethical Behavior

Whether at trainings, lunches, or by the water cooler, open discussion of
ethics offers attorneys opportunities to grapple with thorny ethical issues,
primes attorneys to more automatically consider ethics in their own decision
making, creates an atmosphere that encourages attorneys to seek guidance
from others when they encounter ethical dilemmas, and helps demonstrate
to employees that ethics matter. Openly discussing ethics in organizations is
associated with more ethical conduct328 and tends to have positive effects on
“employee commitment, the perception that it’s acceptable to deliver bad
news, the belief that employees would report an ethics violation, and [the
belief] that decision making is better because of the ethics/compliance
program.”329
The stories that get told around the office send messages about what is
valued. These messages can either reinforce or undermine the more formal
ethics policies of the organization.
[I]n one [prosecutor’s] office with an open file policy, a laudatory
story about a prosecutor’s compliance with the policy to the
office’s strategic disadvantage had entered office lore: Several
different prosecutors recounted it independently. . . . Prosecutors
told the story in the office to convey the importance of complying
with the full disclosure policy, even at the cost of a conviction,
because doing so furthers the office’s broader mission to do
justice.330

Such epic stories need to be told. But so too do stories that describe
ethical behavior that is less visible—stories that highlight the normalcy and
value of such acts. Because others’ unethical conduct is more noticeable
than their ethical conduct,331 not highlighting routine ethical behavior can
reinforce the perception that unethical behavior is more normal and

328. Treviño et al., supra note 65, at 967.
329. Treviño et al., supra note 321, at 143. In contrast, when firms discourage discussion of
ethical issues they may minimize any value that could otherwise have been produced by ethics
training sessions or rules. “An oil company employee asked if he could bring an ethical problem
to a meeting of divisional presidents. Their immediate response was, ‘If he wants to talk ethics,
let him talk to a priest or a psychiatrist. The office is no place for it.’ Imagine what employees
would think of a formal ethics/compliance program in such an environment.” Id.
330. Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 324, at 281–82; see also Scott Killingsworth,
Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance through Organizational Values and
Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961 (2012) (discussing the relationships among
communication, culture, and compliance).
331. See generally supra note 276 (discussing the interpersonal ethics blind spot).
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acceptable than it really is.332 And we have seen that attorneys may
ultimately adjust their own values and practices to be consistent with what
they incorrectly believe to be the norms of their peers.333
These stories and discussions should communicate why ethical rules and
practices are important—for example, that ethical behavior in the
prosecutors’ office is important for due process reasons and to maintain the
respect of the public. People seek to make decisions they can justify334—to
themselves and to others—and are more likely to follow rules that they
believe in and support, than they are to abide by those that they view as an
imposition.335
Respected role models within the organization can demonstrate that
ethics are valued and how to successfully approach practice ethically. 336
Leaders who treat others in a fair and respectful manner, hold themselves to
high and consistent ethical standards and communicate those standards to
others, accept responsibility for their own errors, demonstrate ethical
awareness and a commitment to ethics even while being concerned about
business concerns, remain open to input and feedback, and hold others
accountable for their ethical decisions contribute to an overall climate that

332. See, e.g., Michael E. Brown et al., Ethical Leadership: A Social Learning Perspective
for Construct Development and Testing, 97 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 117, 120 (2005) (“[P]rivately or stoically carrying out ethical actions may be
insufficient to focus attention on ethical conduct.”); see also Robert B. Cialdini, Descriptive
Social Norms as Underappreciated Sources of Social Control, 72 PSYCHOMETRIKA 263, 263
(2007).
333. See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text (discussing pluralistic ignorance).
Entities may also encourage their attorneys to network with attorneys outside the firm with
respect to ethics issues. While confidentiality concerns will prevent attorneys from sharing the
details of a situation with others outside the firm, there may be ways, particularly in a high tech
world, for attorneys to network to discuss ethics with one another anonymously. Kim, supra
note 9, at 1074–75.
334. See, e.g., Christopher K. Hsee, Jiao Zhang, Fang Yu & Yiheng Xi, Lay Rationalism
and Inconsistency Between Predicted Experience and Decision, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
257, 267 (2003); Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11, 14 (1993). Jury
researchers have also found that providing an explanation of the reasons underlying a rule can
help jurors comply with the requirements of the rule. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond &
Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the
Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 557–59 (1992); Duane T. Wegener et al., Flexible
Corrections of Juror Judgments: Implications for Jury Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 629, 646 (2000); Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Fusion of
Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 134–35 (2001).
335. See supra notes 109–112.
336. See Linda K. Treviño & Stuart A. Youngblood, Bad Apples in Bad Barrels: A Causal
Analysis of Ethical Decision-Making Behavior, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 378, 382 (1990)
(finding that vicarious reward influenced outcome expectancies which were associated with
ethical decision making). See generally ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977).
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values ethics.337 By modeling good ethical behavior, key figures in the
organization will also help develop junior attorneys’ schemas for what it
means to be a successful attorney.338 In this way, legal organizations can
help their attorneys rid themselves of an image—shaped in part by images
of lawyers in popular culture—of attorneys as unethical and replace that
image with a more positive view of attorneys’ ethics.
All those who are visible and credible within the organization must
model ethical behavior and take seriously their role of transmitting ethical
norms.339 They must both “‘walk the talk’ and ‘talk the walk’”—making
sure that behavior is consistent with other messages about ethics.340
In a highly competitive environment of intense focus on the
bottom line, employees need to know that the executive leaders in
their organization care about ethics at least as much as financial
performance. An ethical leader makes it clear that strong bottomline results are expected, but only if they can be delivered in a
highly ethical manner.341

Ethical neutrality or silence is not sufficient. Role models need to
publicly enact the organization’s ethical mission through their words and
337. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 332, at 120 (finding that ethical leadership is
associated with outcomes such as a greater willingness to report unethical conduct); Mayer et
al., supra note 323, at 3–7; Mitchell J. Neubert et al., The Virtuous Influence of Ethical
Leadership Behavior: Evidence From the Field, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 157, 165–67 (2009); Linda
K. Treviño et al., A Qualitative Investigation of Perceived Executive Ethical Leadership:
Perceptions From Inside and Outside the Executive Suite, 56 HUM. REL. 5, 14, 18–20 (2003);
Weaver et al., supra note 323, at 316; Wimbush & Shepard, supra note 319, at 642; see also
Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 21 (reporting a meta-analysis that found that a strong
ethical climate, including strong ethical role models, was associated with less unethical
behavior); Marshall Schminke et al., The Effect of Leader Moral Development on Ethical
Climate and Employee Attitudes, 97 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
135, 147 (2005).
338. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (defining “schema”).
339. See Brown et al., supra note 332, at 130; Michael E. Brown & Linda K. Treviño,
Ethical Leadership: A Review and Future Directions, 17 LEADERSHIP Q. 595, 601–02 (2006)
(suggesting importance of seeing “reinforcement of ethical behavior (i.e., ethical leaders get
ahead, unethical leaders do not)”); see also Robert S. Rubin et al., Do Ethical Leaders Get
Ahead? Exploring Ethical Leadership and Promotability, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 215, 223 (2010).
Bar disciplinary authorities, too, have a role to play in communicating acceptable norms. See
Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 739
(2003) (“[W]hen rule violations that are visible or well-known go unsanctioned, such failure to
prosecute undermines the professional standard as a credible threat. It encourages other lawyers
to violate the particular standard or the codes as a whole.”).
340. Michael E. Brown & Marie S. Mitchell, Ethical and Unethical Leadership: Exploring
New Avenues for Future Research, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 583, 584 (2010) (also exploring the
notion of “unethical leadership”).
341. TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 318, at 166.
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their actions, including criticizing, disciplining, or even firing those who do
not act consistently with the ethical mission.342 When New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo fired the director of the State Office of Emergency
Management for deploying government workers to clear his personal
driveway during Hurricane Sandy,343 Cuomo sent a strong message to all
state employees that unethical self-dealing would not be tolerated.
2.

Educate About Ethics

On-going ethics education and self-evaluation are key elements of a
culture that is open about ethics. Ethics training must make ethical
standards clear and avoid sending mixed signals. Clear rules can result in
more ethical behavior and more willingness to confront ethical
misconduct.344 Organizations, however, need to go beyond teaching the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other ethical rules and standards and
acknowledge that most difficult ethical dilemmas arise when important
principles conflict. Thus, just as when learning to write, negotiate, engage in
trial practice, or conduct legal analysis, lawyers need to learn how to think
about the problems they will encounter and acquire specific skills to address
them.345
Organizations should equip attorneys to stand firm in the face of ethical
challenges by teaching them about the psychological factors that inform
decision making processes and set the stage for ethical missteps. Effective
training will also familiarize lawyers and their supervisors with potential
indicia of ethical misconduct and should address the mechanisms for and

342. Id. at 292–303.
343. Danny Hakim, Cuomo Fires Emergency Office Chief for Misusing Workers in
Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A15.
344. See, e.g., Kaptein, supra note 317, at 924–25. One commentator has opined that
military attorneys who were uncomfortable with the Military Commission Act adopted in the
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks were willing and able to speak out against it, even though they
operated within the authoritative context of the military, because they had been trained so
effectively to take responsibility for fair application of the law. McNeal, supra note 33, at 139.
At the same time, clearer rules can make employees less likely to report the problem outside the
organization. See Kaptein, supra note 319, at 924–25.
345. Disciplinary authorities, too, ought to consider education about the psychology of
ethics as a component of discipline or as part of a set of measures aimed at prevention. Common
approaches to ethical violations include disbarment, suspension, reprimand, and ethics
education. See generally A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY
PROCEEDINGS (1979); Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1998). None of
these responses adequately addresses the psychological susceptibilities that we identify here,
nor are they likely to build ethical resilience.

1172

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

benefits of reporting misconduct.346 Training can be used to help attorneys
develop implementation intentions347 and to make explicit ethical
commitments. To be effective, trainings need to avoid vague generalities
and instead address the kinds of ethical issues that are most likely to arise in
the particular settings. Focusing on actual issues that have come up in the
organization in the past is one way to make the training more directly
meaningful.
Role playing may help make ethical temptations more concrete and
allow opportunities for thinking about specific alternative responses. In
addition, such practice can strengthen attorneys’ moral “muscles,” focus
their attention on the need to exercise self-control at times of depletion,
motivate them to do so, and, thus, increase their capacity to resist
temptation.348
One of us frequently asks law students to engage in a negotiation
exercise as part of a class on negotiation ethics. Even though the students
are primed to focus on ethical concerns (the very topic of the class is
negotiation ethics and the relevant ethical rules and contract doctrines are
assigned as reading prior to class), many students engage in conduct that
their counterparts find problematic. Students on each side often lie or fail to
disclose information that the other side believes is “material.” Whereas each
side is often able to justify their conduct—explaining, for example, that the
other side “didn’t ask,” or that their client did not want them to disclose the
information—their opponents are typically outraged and feel they have been
lied to. Exploring these reactions can help attorneys understand the
consequences of their ability to justify their own conduct.349
346. Marcia P. Miceli et al., A Word to the Wise: How Managers and Policy-Makers Can
Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 385 (2009).
347. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
348. While resisting unethical behavior may deplete capacity in the short term, it can be
possible to strengthen it in the long term. See generally Roy F. Baumeister et al., The Strength
Model of Self-Control, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 351 (2007); Mark Muraven et
al., Longitudinal Improvement of Self-Regulation Through Practice: Building Self-Control
Strength Through Repeated Exercise, 139 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 446 (1999); Martin S. Hagger et al.,
Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL.
495 (2010).
349. Ethics educators Linda Treviño and Katherine Nelson recommend an exercise that
presents participants with ethical dilemmas related to their work that do not have clear answers.
Participants discuss the problems in groups, present their course of action, are challenged by a
devil’s advocate, and are scored on their responses. Participants can then appeal to a board of
senior colleagues with whom they can discuss the problems. In addition to providing an
opportunity to engage with each other about difficult ethical dilemmas, the exercise facilitates
ethical communication between people at different levels of the organization, and by including
senior colleagues on the “appeals board” signals that the conversations are worth having.
TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 318, at 233–35.
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Finally, the attitude organizations convey when conducting ethics
training is critically important. To encourage a principled rather than an
instrumental ethical culture,350 training should communicate the value of
ethics and the principles underlying the relevant ethical requirements. 351
Organizations that convey that ethics training is a required inconvenience—
just a box to be checked on the CLE form or window dressing to be
displayed for particular audiences—seriously diminish the value of the
training.
3.

Encourage Learning From Mistakes

The challenges of learning from ethical mistakes352 affect legal
organizations as well as individual lawyers. One study of how ethics were
handled in law firms found that “information regarding the nature of the
problems or questions, and how they are resolved was rarely, if ever, fed
back into the firm. Both associates and partners seemed unaware of the
extent of reported (or unreported) problems, questions, or violations of
ethical standards.”353 Yet, when there is no feedback, learning will suffer,354
and this may lead to further deterioration in the entity’s ethical norms.
The mindset with which one approaches mistakes can make a
tremendous difference for the ability to learn from them. Specifically, those
with a fixed mindset see mistakes as an indication of incompetence or
stupidity, react to them with anger or depression, and therefore miss out on
opportunities to learn and improve. But those with a growth mindset see
mistakes as opportunities to learn how to do better.355 Thus, part of
establishing an ethical culture is to inculcate a learning or growth
orientation to dealing with mistakes—providing and embracing
opportunities for self-criticism.
In this vein, organizations may want to establish processes to help
attorneys learn from ethical missteps. For example, consider how Penn
State University hired former FBI Director Louis Freeh and his staff to
conduct a report on Penn State officials’ response to the reports of child
350. See supra notes 326–327.
351. See supra notes 326–327, 334–335.
352. See supra Part III.
353. Messikomer, supra note 14, at 760.
354. See Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can
Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 29 (1998).
355. CAROL DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS 6–7 (2007). See also
Julie A. Oseid & Stephen D. Easton, “And Bad Mistakes, I’ve Made Few”: Sharing Mistakes
to Mentor New Lawyers, __ ALBANY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2337241.
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abuse by Assistant Football Coach Jerry Sandusky. The resulting report
found that Penn State officials had made numerous missteps and suggested
that specific reforms be made to avoid such lapses in the future.356 While not
all organizations can afford—nor do all issues require—such a large-scale
investigation, organizations would be well advised to appropriately explore
what led an attorney to overstate her hours, borrow trust fund money, omit
crucial information from a filing, or fail to consider evidence of a
defendant’s innocence.
4.

Protect Attorneys From Cognitive, Temporal, and Financial
Stresses

Cognitive and temporal overloads tend to increase the likelihood that
attorneys will engage in unethical conduct.357 Although some of these
stresses seem inherent to many legal jobs, their connection to ethical
problems should give firms an incentive to provide attorneys with sufficient
support staff, effective software, and office systems and structures to help
prevent and catch problems.358 Firms can also strive to treat their attorneys
humanely, and to schedule work in a reasonable fashion. Even providing
exercise opportunities to employees359 may pay ethical dividends. While all
of these steps have costs, so too do ethical mistakes.
356. Brad Wolverton, Penn State’s Culture of Reverence Led to ‘Total Disregard’ for
Children’s Safety, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 12, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/PennStates-Culture-of/132853; see also, e.g., Terry Frieden, Fast and Furious Report Finds DOJ
Management
Failures,
CNN.COM
(Sept.
19,
2012,
2:13
PM),
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/19/fast-and-furious-report-finds-doj-management-failures
(describing DOJ report about a year-long investigation that uncovered widespread failures at the
BATF); cf. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-walmart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html (describing how Wal-Mart executives shut down
an investigation that started to “unearth[] evidence of widespread bribery” in Mexico).
357. See supra Part II.D.
358. For example, firms can provide systems for screening and dealing with conflicts of
interest. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 289–307 (describing firms without systems or
using systems that rely on lawyer memory to catch conflicts). Relying on memory to flag
conflicts is fraught with peril. Id. at 344; see also Kaptein, supra note 319, at 925 (identifying
“feasibility” as a dimension of ethical culture—“unethical conduct occurred when employees
lacked adequate or sufﬁcient time, budgets, equipment, information, and authority to fulﬁll their
responsibilities”).
359. See, e.g., Workplace Health Promotion: Physical Activity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/implementation/topics/physical-activity.html
(describing benefits of providing exercise opportunities to employees) (last visited Oct. 25,
2013).
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Even when it proves impractical to limit cognitive and temporal stresses,
organizations should urge their attorneys to do those tasks that involve
ethical challenges when they are most fresh, rather than most depleted.
Whenever they face tasks that afford opportunities to cheat,
managers may benefit by scheduling these tasks when they are
fresh and well rested (e.g., not after a long flight). Similarly,
managers may benefit from arranging tasks to reduce the
likelihood that their employees will face ethical decisions when
their self-regulatory resources are depleted.360

Firms can also take steps to relieve the economic pressures that may lead
attorneys to cross ethical lines. While organizations cannot fully protect
their attorneys from financial problems, they may be able to provide
financial counseling, short term low interest loans,361 or information on how
to access other sources of psychological or financial assistance (such as
through a local bar association).
5.

Structure Rewards to Encourage Ethical Behavior

Organizations should do what they can to reward conduct that promotes
ethics362 and to judge decisions based on the quality of the underlying
decision making process rather than solely on the ultimate outcomes.363 In
other words, firms need to figure out ways to reward attorneys who engage
in the kinds of conduct and decision making processes that are most likely
to lead to the most effective and ethical strategies. While it may be more
difficult to look beyond hours, wins, and fees to assess lawyering, it is
important to avoid rewarding unethical attorneys.
360. Gino et al., supra note 181, at 200. When depleted, attorneys can do their best to
revive themselves by taking a rest, having a snack, going for a short walk, or meditating.
361. See Levin, supra note 17, at 387 (advising that firms should “try to limit the situations
in which lawyers are overwhelmed by their financial circumstances or case loads and to provide
for more outside support for handling these situations when they arise”).
362. See Kim supra note 9, at 1053 (suggesting companies regulate compensation to
decrease self-interest); John M. Darley, The Dynamics of Authority Influence in Organizations
and the Unintended Action Consequences, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 195, at 40 (“[I]ncentive systems have an elevated status for
communicating what the organization ‘really wants’ and ‘really values.’ In a world in which
talk is regarded as cheap, bonuses, promotions, and other tangible marks of valuing are what
really matter.”); John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in
CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 254, at 25
(“Corporations that put in place a corporate ethics code and do not consider its relationship to
existing corporate practices and bonus and promotion systems seem to me to be engaging in
window dressing of a particularly cynical sort.”).
363. Baron & Hershey, supra note 83, at 574.

1176

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Consider the positive messages sent in the following environment:
One CEO of a financial services firm was very serious about
identifying and rewarding people who lived his organization’s
values. He challenged his executives to bring him stories of
employees who were doing the right things in the right way, who
were models of the culture. He collected these stories and sent
personal, handwritten thank-you notes to those model employees.
While a phone call might have sufficed, employees were so
thrilled with his written recognition and praise that they displayed
his notes in their offices. Those framed notes sent a rather loud
message to other employees about what kind of behavior was
valued at high levels. Of course, they also helped spread word of
the ‘heroes’ and their deeds.364

Consider also the messages sent by a firm that provides attorneys with a
pay bonus for billing 1,800 hours, and an even greater bonus for billing
each additional 1,000 hours. Such an incentive scheme is likely to tempt
even the most ethical of attorneys to round up her hours, double-bill a few
hours to multiple clients, or perhaps “borrow” some hours from a future
billing period. Or, consider a prosecutor’s office that provides kudos or
promotions to those prosecutors with the highest conviction rates. While
these practices can be defended as encouraging “hard work,” it is clear that
they can also incentivize unethical conduct. Entities that take the trouble to
reward attorneys based on a broader set of accomplishments will likely be
repaid with more ethical work habits.365
6.

Encourage Ethical Reporting

No matter how hard organizations try to prevent unethical conduct,
lapses may occur and will need to be addressed. Understanding the thought
processes that decision makers go through before reporting an ethical
violation can help organizations identify the measures that they can take to
ensure that employees will make reports of ethical misconduct when
appropriate. A potential reporter must:
364. TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 318, at 181–82.
365. See Kirkland, supra note 236, at 615 (quoting Interview with General Counsel No. 4,
at 38 (2007–2008) (on file with author)) (“[describing reports of] statistics collected by
malpractice insurers that show a correlation between firms’ compensation systems and firm risk
profiles. One general counsel explained, ‘The liability insurers will tell you the closer you are to
a ‘lock step’ compensation system, the safer your profile. The closer you are to an ‘eat what you
kill’ system the riskier the profile—the greater the number of claims.’”); see also John M.
Darley, Setting Standards Seeks Control, Risks Distortion, 32 PUB. AFF. REP. 3, 5 (1991)
(describing the distorting effects of criterial-control systems).
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(1) recognize that a violation has occurred;
(2) decide that the infraction warrants intervention;
(3) decide that the observer is responsible for taking action on the
matter;
(4) identify what responsive actions are available; and
(5) conclude that the benefits of reporting the violation outweigh the
costs.366
Measures that take these steps into account are likely to be most effective
in encouraging reporting. For example, ethical training and culture can help
attorneys recognize that an ethical violation has occurred and warrants
intervention.367 In addition, organizations can make clear that ensuring
organization-wide ethical compliance is part of attorneys’ job
responsibilities and will benefit the organization.368 Attorneys may hesitate
to “tattle” on their peers if they feel they are stepping outside their role, but
will more likely report problems if such reporting is considered part of their
job, and if they know that reporting is designed to benefit the
organization.369
Organizations can also encourage attorneys to raise ethics issues by
providing specific and multiple channels through which individuals can
dissent and raise questions.370 Multiple channels for reporting allow
employees to choose one with which they are comfortable.371 As one
possible reporting channel, some large firms now have outside or in-house
ethics counsel, an ethics committee, or an ethics ombudsperson who can
366. See Marcia P. Miceli et al., Who Blows the Whistle and Why?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 113, 115 (1991); aee also Michael E. Roloff & Gaylen D. Paulson, Confronting
Organizational Transgressions, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 195, at 57–60 (dividing the preconfrontation process into “SenseMaking” and “Action Formation”).
367. See supra Section IV.B.2 (discussing appropriate ethical training).
368. Employees are more likely to report perceived ethical problems internally when they
view such reporting as part of their assigned role. Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & Chockalingam
Viswesvaran, Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of
Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 277, 286 (2005); Marcia
Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationships Among Beliefs, Organizational Position,
and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 ACAD. MGMT. J. 687, 696 (1984); see
also Miceli et al., supra note 366, at 123; Linda Klebe Treviño & Bart Victor, Peer Reporting of
Unethical Behavior: A Social Context Perspective, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 38, 47 (1992); Bart
Victor et al., Peer Reporting of Unethical Behavior: The Influence of Justice Evaluations and
Social Context Factors, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 258 (1993).
369. Victor et al., supra note 368, at 258.
370. Kurt Lewin, Group Decision and Social Change, in READINGS IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 330 (Guy E. Swanson et al. eds., 1952) (focusing on shaping behavior by using
channel factors—relatively minor changes in the relevant situation—that can have a significant
influence on behavior by leading or “channeling” people in a particular direction).
371. Miceli et al., supra note 346, at 388.
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serve this role.372 While lawyers in such a role may share some incentives
with others in the firm,373 they may be more removed from the immediate
pressures of at least some ethical situations. Because such counsel will not
be directly involved with the client, case, or deal at issue, she may be more
objective than the attorney directly affected and thus less tempted to counsel
unethical actions.374 For example, when exploring a potential conflict of
interest, ethics counsel can consider the matter as a part of the firm’s
interests and larger book of business rather than leaving the decision to the
attorney for whom the potential conflict may represent significant new
business.375 In addition, consulting ethics counsel can be designated as an
accepted part of the entity’s practice and the attorney’s role.376
Organizations must not only provide the channels for reporting, but also
ensure that reporting leads to outcomes that are perceived to be appropriate.
When employees believe that their ethical reports are likely to be taken
seriously, they are more likely to make such reports.377 While organizations
will have to find a balance between treating reports of real wrongdoing
seriously and not “rewarding the gadfly or chronic low performer seeking to

372. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 559 (2002); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel,
84 N.C. L. REV. 1515 (2005–2006); Jonathan D. Glater, In a Complex World, Even Lawyers
Need Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/03/business/in-acomplex-world-even-lawyers-need-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
373. Kirkland, supra note 70, at 188, 192 (explaining that “ethics counsel see their jobs as
finding ways to take on as much new work as they can without running afoul of the ethics rules”
and that they “struggle to find ways to say yes even when there is a conflict”); Suchman, supra
note 101, at 864 (describing interview with lawyer at a firm at which the “ethics committee”
was called the “No Business Committee”).
374. Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers are Different and Why We are the Same: Creating
Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior—In-House Ethics
Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 704 (2011).
375. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 363–64. Ethics counsel who are compensated
directly for their special role tend to take the position more seriously and see it as less
burdensome than do those ethics counsel who are asked to do the job on top of their other
duties. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 372, at 572–73. Because attorneys are subject to
group pressures and may become committed to positions they have taken, fresh perspectives can
be helpful. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 113 (suggesting rotating personnel as a means to
encourage more ethical behavior).
376. Rotunda, supra note 374, at 706.
377. Miceli et al., supra note 346, at 388–89 (employees are less likely to report perceived
ethical problems if they don’t think anything will or can be done to rectify the problem); see
also Kaptein, supra note 319, at 927 (finding that “sanctionability” is positively associated with
confrontation of unethical behavior and reporting to management and negatively related to
external whistleblowing).
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distract attention, . . . [or] wasting time on frivolous complaints,”378 it is
important to investigate claims fully and fairly.
When the organization finds a complaint to be legitimate, it should take
prompt action to address the concern and communicate that action to the
reporter. This action should focus not only on any “bad apples” who have
acted unethically, but also on correcting any systemic problems. 379
Sometimes it will also be appropriate to publicize instances in which
reporting led to positive change, while at the same time being careful to
protect confidentiality and not to spark retaliation. Providing feedback to
reporting attorneys about the actions taken also encourages continued
reporting.
A client did not want to disclose a particular document; instead, he
wanted to get rid of it. I told the senior associate, and he told me
that the partners did not want to know about it. However, I did not
like that result. I wrote a legal memorandum politely describing
the problem and discussing the case law requiring us to turn over
the document. I sent it to the partners who promptly overruled the
senior associate and turned over the document. Later, one of the
partners called me in his office and thanked me for what I had
done. “We could have gotten into a problem over that,” he said.
The partner was promoting the right culture.380

When the organization ultimately finds that a report was not well
founded, it is equally important to provide feedback to the attorney reporter.
This feedback should include clarifying what conduct is unethical and what
conduct the company believes should be reported.381
Finally, it is also important to assure attorneys that they will be protected
rather than punished for reporting possible ethical issues.382 Fear of
retaliation reduces the likelihood of internal reporting.383 It is not that people
“expect or want a reward for doing the right thing. They just don’t want to
be punished for it.”384 Of course, it is critically important to ensure that the
protections that organizations provide to attorneys are “real” and not just

378. Miceli et al., supra note 346, at 388.
379. Id. at 389.
380. Rotunda, supra note 374, at 703.
381. Miceli et al., supra note 346, at 388–89.
382. See Miceli et al., supra note 366, at 115; see also, e.g., Kim, supra note 9, at 1064–71
(suggesting that companies offer better whistle-blower protection).
383. David M. Mayer et al., Encouraging Employees to Report Unethical Conduct
Internally: It Takes a Village, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 89,
89 (2013).
384. TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 318, at 281.
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window dressing that is ignored when promotion, compensation, and
retention decisions are made.385
Certain employees may be more likely to report perceived ethical
problems than others. For example, employees are more likely to report
ethical problems internally when they have greater commitment to their job,
higher job satisfaction,386 and feel they are treated fairly.387 Thus,
organizations that are interested in encouraging ethical reporting by their
attorneys will also want to focus more generally on their attorneys’
workplace satisfaction. Because more junior employees are generally less
likely to report perceived ethical problems, organizations may want to focus
on helping these more junior attorneys recognize what misconduct needs to
be reported, understand the organization’s commitment to ethics, know how
to report,388 and feel secure in reporting ethical issues. More junior
employees are likely to feel more vulnerable and, thus, may need greater
assurances.389
7.

Monitor Ethics

Finally, organizations can and indeed are required to take steps to
monitor the ethical performance of their attorney employees. 390 Given the
very human ways in which people can fall prey to ethical temptations,
entities should not assume that attorneys are behaving ethically, but should
instead develop systems to provide checks on behavior—whether by using
software to monitor billing patterns, having colleagues double-check what
discovery or due diligence is produced, reviewing how attorneys conduct
negotiations, or monitoring how attorneys prepare their clients for
depositions or trial. It is most important to monitor situations in which
attorneys, due to cognitive or temporal depletion or structural temptations,
385. Id. at 280 (“The organization’s treatment of whistle-blowers is a relevant reward
system concern and a frequent source of misalignment.”).
386. Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, supra note 368, at 286; Miceli et al., supra note 366,
at 123.
387. Victor et al., supra note 368, at 259.
388. Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, supra note 368, at 293–94.
389. More accomplished, more competent employees are more likely to blow the whistle on
perceived ethical problems. Marcia P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, Individual and Situational
Correlates of Whistle-Blowing, 41 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 267, 275 (1988); Miceli et al., supra
note 366, at 123.
390. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (“A partner in a law firm . . . shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that
all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”); see also Irwin D.
Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys’ Supervisory Duties, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259, 276 (1994).
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are most likely to engage in ethical misconduct. 391 As noted earlier, when
ethical improprieties are found, organizations should discipline attorneys
found to have behaved inappropriately, determine whether systemic
changes should be made, and provide appropriate feedback to the
community.
While structural systems to monitor ethical performance are perhaps
necessary, research has found that intrinsic motives, identification with the
rules of the organization, and believing that the organization is legitimate
tend to have a greater effect on rule following (and a commitment to
following the rules) than do perceptions of the likelihood of detection and
the nature of the likely sanctions.392 Thus, even as they build systems to help
attorneys avoid missteps, organizations should act in ways—enacting fair
processes and treating attorneys fairly—that help attorneys see the entity as
legitimate and as embodying values that are congruent with their own.393 Of
particular importance are providing opportunities for input into
organizational policies, making decisions in a neutral fashion using
transparent and objective criteria, making decisions that treat people
consistently and respectfully, and providing explanations for decisions
reached.394 Developing such procedures can reap a variety of benefits:
First, in a culture where transparent procedures are
voluntarily embraced, the self-policing mechanisms that will
thrive in the organization will be more likely to expose
wrongdoing in its infancy. . . Second, a culture in which rulefollowing is the expected norm and cynicism is low will be a far
less comfortable environment for those who would prefer to break
the rules. And finally, in a culture in which rule-following is the
accepted norm, scoundrels and cheats will be far less likely to
ascend to the positions of power in which they can do significant
damage.395

391. Brown & Treviño, supra note 339, at 602; Gino et al., supra note 181, at 200; see also
Langevoort, supra note 33, at 101–04 (suggesting that firms watch for red flags).
392. Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee
Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143, 1153
(2005); see also Tom R. Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment to Compliance: Building ValueBased Cultures, 50 CAL. MGMT. REV. 31, 32 (2008).
393. Tyler et al., supra note 392, at 33.
394. Id. at 38.
395. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS 117
(2011).
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CONCLUSION

“[T]o understand all is not to forgive all . . . [b]ut . . . to
understand all may well put us on guard against doing the
unforgivable.”396
While research into the psychology of legal ethics is ongoing, 397 current
knowledge can help individual attorneys and organizations employing those
attorneys resist the pull of unethical behavior. Having learned that
“[a]ttributing blame solely to flawed individuals or corrupt organizations
rarely captures the subtleties of how ethical misconduct occurs,” and instead
“offers false reassurance that only moral deviants, not ordinary people,
engage in such behavior,”398 we are better equipped to fight against the slide
into misconduct.

396. Luban, supra note 204, at 116.
397. Empirical research should build on our analysis to further explore how the ethical
decision making of attorneys compares to that of other actors.
398. REGAN, supra note 13, at 294.

